@SECLEVEL=1 in the cipher string does not reliably lower the security
level for DTLS_METHOD contexts across all pyOpenSSL/OpenSSL builds.
Instead, explicitly allow error 66 (X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK) in the
verify callback. This is the error OpenSSL emits when a CA certificate
uses SHA-1 — which Samsung's OCF Root CA does. All other verification
errors (chain trust, expiry, key usage, revocation) are still enforced.
OpenSSL 3.x defaults to SECLEVEL=2, which rejects SHA-1 digests in the
certificate chain. Samsung's OCF Root CA is SHA-1 signed, so peer
verification failed with "ca md too weak" on every connect attempt.
SECLEVEL=1 (80-bit minimum) allows SHA-1 in the CA chain while still
enforcing meaningful key-strength and cipher constraints. Not going back
to SECLEVEL=0 which removes all restrictions.
- translations/en.json: runtime translation file HA loads (strings.json
is tooling-only); includes data_description hints for host, cert, key
- config_flow.py: cert_pem and key_pem rendered as multiline text areas
via TextSelector so users can paste full PEM blocks; host stays single-line
- strings.json: expanded error messages and data_description to match
- entity.py: entities with name=None (pattern-cap doors, temps, icemmakers)
now derive a human-readable title from their state key instead of
displaying blank ("door_cooler_open1" → "Door Cooler Open 1")
Makes the integration fully self-contained for HACS distribution.
Users installing via HACS get everything in one directory; no external
samsung_appliance package needed.
All component imports updated to relative (.ocf.*); all test imports
updated to custom_components.localthings.ocf.*. ocf_root_ca.pem moves
with the package and resolves correctly via Path(__file__).parent.
Marc Billow