fix:image url validation and signout post (#24420)
* refac(routers): reject external URLs in profile/model image handlers * refac(ui): centralize image URL validation in safeImageUrl helper * refac(auths): make signout POST-only * refac: gate external profile image redirect behind ENABLE_PROFILE_IMAGE_URL_FORWARDING Restore the 302 redirect for external http(s) profile image URLs in the user and model profile-image endpoints, but gate it behind a new ENABLE_PROFILE_IMAGE_URL_FORWARDING env flag (default: True). Existing deployments that rely on external profile image forwarding continue to work unchanged. Operators who want to suppress the redirect (to prevent client-side IP/UA/Referer leaks) can set the flag to False.
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import { WEBUI_BASE_URL } from '$lib/constants';
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const PLACEHOLDER_IMAGE = '/favicon.png';
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/**
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* Validates an image URL against an allowlist of safe patterns and returns
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* the URL if trusted, or a placeholder otherwise.
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*
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* Allowed patterns:
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* - Relative paths (starting with '/')
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* - data:image/* URIs
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* - Same-origin URLs (starting with WEBUI_BASE_URL)
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* - Gravatar URLs (https://www.gravatar.com/avatar/)
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*
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* All other URLs (including arbitrary http(s):// origins) are rejected to
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* prevent client-side IP/UA/Referer leaks to attacker-controlled servers.
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*/
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export function safeImageUrl(url: string): string {
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if (!url || url === '') {
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return `${WEBUI_BASE_URL}${PLACEHOLDER_IMAGE}`;
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}
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if (
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url.startsWith(WEBUI_BASE_URL) ||
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url.startsWith('https://www.gravatar.com/avatar/') ||
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url.startsWith('data:') ||
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url.startsWith('/')
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) {
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return url;
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}
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return `${WEBUI_BASE_URL}${PLACEHOLDER_IMAGE}`;
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}
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