* feat: add support for Valkey vector database
Signed-off-by: Riley Des <riley.desserre@improving.com>
* feat: add CLIENT SETNAME to Valkey vector store connections
Set client_name on GlideClientConfiguration for both the main client
and batch client so connections are identifiable in CLIENT LIST,
monitoring dashboards, and CloudWatch metrics.
Signed-off-by: Riley Des <riley.desserre@improving.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Riley Des <riley.desserre@improving.com>
Firecrawl /search returns either `{"data": [...]}` (flat list — v1, and
what frost19k reported on #23966) or `{"data": {"web": [...]}}` (v2,
current production). The parser only handled the dict shape:
data = response.get('data') or {}
results = data.get('web') or []
On a list-shape response, `data.get('web')` raised AttributeError,
caught by the function's outer try/except, and `search_firecrawl`
silently returned []. Web search worked against v2 endpoints but is one
upstream-format-change away from failing closed again. Accept either.
Open WebUI's collection ACL accepted any unknown name as a
legacy/ephemeral collection. In Milvus multi-tenancy mode that name
becomes the `resource_id` and is interpolated unescaped into a SQL-like
Milvus expression — `resource_id == '<name>'` — so a name like
x' or resource_id != '' or resource_id == 'x
turns the filter into a tautology and returns every tenant's chunks
from the shared collection.
All collection names Open WebUI generates are UUIDs, SHA-256 hex
digests, or fixed-prefix variants of those — they all fit
[A-Za-z0-9_-]. Add a strict format check in
filter_accessible_collections (utils.py) that drops any name outside
that set before any ACL or vector-store lookup, applied even on the
admin bypass path. _validate_collection_access then surfaces the dropped
name as a 403.
As defense in depth, MilvusClient now validates resource_id at every
expression-construction site and escapes single quotes / backslashes in
any other string interpolated into a filter (delete ids, metadata
filter values). Non-string filter values are typed-checked instead of
str()-formatted.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
validate_url() resolves DNS to check IPs but discards the result; the
HTTP client resolves again independently. Between those two lookups an
attacker can swap the DNS record from a public IP to an internal one
(DNS rebinding).
Push the IP-is-global check into the actual connection layer so the
validated resolution is the one used for the TCP connect:
- aiohttp (_fetch): _SSRFSafeResolver wraps DefaultResolver and rejects
non-global IPs at resolve time (zero TOCTOU window).
- requests (_scrape): _SSRFSafeAdapter mounts custom urllib3 connection
classes whose _new_conn resolves, validates, and connects to the
validated IP in one shot (zero TOCTOU window).
Both paths respect ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH (skip validation when on).
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
SafePlaywrightURLLoader validated only the initially submitted URL and
then let the browser follow HTTP redirects and client-side navigations
without re-checking them, so a public URL could redirect into the
internal network (cloud metadata, RFC1918, loopback). Intercept
document-type requests, re-run validate_url on each, and apply the same
redirect policy as the requests loader (blocked unless
AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS). Sub-resource requests pass through
unchanged so page rendering performance is unaffected.
Co-authored-by: POV9en <POV9en@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The __main__ block called search_bing() with 4 positional arguments, but
the function requires 5 (subscription_key, endpoint, locale, query,
count). Running `python -m open_webui.retrieval.web.bing` raised a
TypeError and, before failing, silently misrouted every argument. Read
the key/endpoint from environment variables, matching config.py defaults.
Closes#24765
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
urllib.parse.urlparse and requests/aiohttp disagree on how to split URLs
containing backslash, tab, CR, or LF in or around the netloc. urlparse
treats backslash as part of userinfo and uses what follows '@' as the
host; requests treats backslash as the start of the path and connects
to whatever precedes it. The same URL therefore passes the private-IP
filter (urlparse sees a public host) but reaches an internal target
(requests connects to e.g. 127.0.0.1). End result is an SSRF that the
existing IP block list cannot catch because it's evaluating the wrong
host.
PoC: http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1 — urlparse hostname is 1.1.1.1
(global, passes), requests reaches 127.0.0.1 (loopback).
Reject up front any URL containing one of the four documented parser-
confusing characters before either parser gets a chance to interpret
it. None of these characters is valid in an unencoded URL (\ should
always be %5C, whitespace should be %09 / %0A / %0D), so this is a
pure defensive rejection with no legitimate-input false positives.
Reported by Fushuling and RacerZ-fighting in GHSA-8w7q-q5jp-jvgx.
Co-authored-by: Fushuling <Fushuling@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: RacerZ-fighting <RacerZ-fighting@users.noreply.github.com>
validate_url() in retrieval/web/utils.py only validates the initial URL.
The HTTP clients used downstream (sync requests, sync requests via the
parent WebBaseLoader._scrape, aiohttp via load_url_image) followed 3xx
redirects by default and did not re-validate the redirect target against
the private-IP / metadata-IP block list. An authenticated user could
submit a public URL that 302-redirected to an internal address (RFC1918,
127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, etc.) and the redirected response was returned
to them, enabling SSRF reads of internal services and cloud metadata.
Three call sites needed allow_redirects=False to match the policy already
enforced on the async _fetch() path:
- SafeWebBaseLoader: override requests_kwargs in __init__ so that the
inherited synchronous _scrape() path passes allow_redirects=False to
self.session.get() (the parent WebBaseLoader uses requests' default
allow_redirects=True).
- get_content_from_url (retrieval/utils.py): pass allow_redirects=False
on the streamed requests.get(...) call.
- load_url_image (routers/images.py, image-edits endpoint): pass
allow_redirects=False on the aiohttp session.get(...) call.
Reports consolidated under GHSA-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6:
- GHSA-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6 (tenbbughunters / Tenable) - sync _scrape
- GHSA-5vxg-6gmv-m2qr (YLChen-007) - load_url_image
- GHSA-hf76-c83f-63w2 (tempcollab) - aiohttp _fetch (already fixed)
- GHSA-h55f-h5fh-mvm4 (sneaXOR) - get_content_from_url
Add configurable reranker batch size (env var RAG_RERANKING_BATCH_SIZE,
default 32) following the same pattern as RAG_EMBEDDING_BATCH_SIZE.
- config.py: PersistentConfig for RAG_RERANKING_BATCH_SIZE
- main.py: import, state init, pass to get_reranking_function
- colbert.py: accept batch_size param in predict() (was hardcoded 32)
- utils.py: get_reranking_function passes batch_size at call time
- retrieval.py: expose in config GET/POST endpoints and ConfigForm
- Documents.svelte: add Reranking Batch Size input in admin settings
Closes#23730
Timothy Jaeryang Baek