generateFollowUps in src/lib/apis/index.ts is dead: it appears only at
its own definition, nothing imports or calls it, and it targets a
non-existent path (/api/v1/tasks/follow_ups/completions, plural) while
the real route is /tasks/follow_up/completions (singular). Follow-up
suggestions are generated server-side in the chat-completion middleware
and delivered over the chat:message:follow_ups websocket event, so this
wrapper was never on the live path.
Removes only the dead wrapper. The backend POST /tasks/follow_up/completions
endpoint is intentionally kept: it is a member of the actively-used
/tasks/*/completions family (title, tags, emoji, queries, moa) and its
handler delegates to the core generate_follow_ups function.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The bulk-clear-chat-tags endpoint's only frontend wrapper,
deleteTagsById in src/lib/apis/chats/index.ts, is dead: nothing imports
or calls it, the path is referenced nowhere else, and the route handler
has no internal caller. Removes the route handler, the dead wrapper, and
the now-orphaned Chats.delete_all_tags_by_id_and_user_id model method
(its sole caller was this route). The shared
Chats.delete_orphan_tags_for_user method is untouched.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /utils/markdown rendered a markdown string to HTML server-side. Its
only frontend wrapper, getHTMLFromMarkdown in src/lib/apis/utils/index.ts,
is dead: nothing imports or calls it, the route is hit by no other code
path, and the path string appears nowhere else in the repo (no direct
fetch, no test, no docs). Markdown is rendered client-side in the UI, so
this endpoint was redundant.
Fully self-contained removal: the endpoint, its MarkdownForm model, the
now-orphaned 'import markdown' in the utils router (used only here), and
the dead getHTMLFromMarkdown wrapper. Nothing else depends on any of them.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
GET /evaluations/feedbacks/all returned the entire feedback table in a
single response (flagged as a Medium OOM risk for admins in
open-webui#22206). Its only frontend wrapper, getAllFeedbacks in
src/lib/apis/evaluations/index.ts, is dead: nothing imports or calls it
anywhere in the codebase. The endpoint is a redundant view-only twin of
GET /evaluations/feedbacks/all/export, which is what the admin Feedbacks
UI actually uses.
Removes the endpoint, the now-unused FeedbackResponse import in the
evaluations router, and the dead getAllFeedbacks frontend wrapper. The
shared Feedbacks.get_all_feedbacks data-layer method is kept, since the
live /feedbacks/all/export endpoint still uses it.
Ref: open-webui#22206
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
These 19 exported wrappers are dead: each appears exactly once in the
codebase (its own definition), nothing imports or calls any of them, and
none has a corresponding backend route. They are leftovers from settings
that were consolidated server-side into /auths/admin/config,
/openai/config, /ollama/config and /api/config:
- index.ts: getModelFilterConfig, updateModelFilterConfig,
getCommunitySharingEnabledStatus, toggleCommunitySharingEnabledStatus,
getModelConfig, updateModelConfig (+ orphaned GlobalModelConfig type)
- auths: getSignUpEnabledStatus, toggleSignUpEnabledStatus,
getDefaultUserRole, updateDefaultUserRole, getJWTExpiresDuration,
updateJWTExpiresDuration
- openai: getOpenAIUrls, updateOpenAIUrls, getOpenAIKeys, updateOpenAIKeys
- ollama: updateOllamaUrls
- prompts: restorePromptFromHistory
- folders: updateFolderItemsById (+ orphaned FolderItems type)
Shared types (ModelConfig/ModelMeta/ModelParams) and all live wrappers
are untouched. Removal is import-safe: nothing referenced these.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reported by bwgabrielsusai on #24719: granting a user only
`workspace.skills` doesn't show the Workspace menu, and visiting
`/workspace` directly bounces them to `/`.
The per-route guard in `/workspace/+layout.svelte` already covered
skills, but two earlier gates in the chain didn't:
* `Sidebar.svelte` case 'workspace' OR'd models/knowledge/prompts/tools
to decide menu visibility — skills was missing, so the entry never
rendered for skills-only users.
* `/workspace/+page.svelte` redirect chain picked the first available
section — skills was missing, so the fallback `goto('/')` fired.
Adding skills to both.
Adds an IFRAME_CSP environment variable that injects a Content-Security-Policy
<meta> tag into all srcdoc iframes rendering untrusted content:
- Artifacts (LLM-generated HTML previews)
- FullHeightIframe (tool/embed output)
- FilePreview (user-uploaded HTML files)
- CitationModal (RAG document HTML)
Shared utility in src/lib/utils/csp.ts handles injection with HTML-safe
attribute escaping. URL-based iframes (src=) are correctly excluded.
Env-var only — no PersistentConfig, no admin UI, no DB. Set once at deploy
time, requires restart. Empty string (default) means no CSP restriction.
New **pt-BR** translations for items introduced in the latest releases, plus a consistency/quality pass across existing strings (grammar, tone, capitalization, pluralization). Placeholders and hotkeys preserved. No logic changes.
* fix: gate public sharing of calendars behind sharing.public_calendars permission
The calendar router did not call filter_allowed_access_grants on either the
create or update endpoint, while every other shareable resource in the
codebase (channels, knowledge, models, notes, prompts, skills, tools) does.
A verified non-admin owner could therefore attach
`{"principal_type":"user","principal_id":"*","permission":"read"|"write"}`
to their own calendar in the create or update payload and have it persisted
unfiltered. Any other verified user with the (default-on) features.calendar
permission could then read or, for write grants, write events on it via the
existing /events* endpoints, bypassing the per-user sharing.public_<X>
permission gate the rest of the resource cohort enforces.
Three changes:
- config.py: add USER_PERMISSIONS_CALENDAR_ALLOW_PUBLIC_SHARING (default
False, env-overridable) and surface it in DEFAULT_USER_PERMISSIONS
['sharing']['public_calendars'] so admins can grant it per group via the
same UI used for notes/models/etc.
- routers/calendar.py: import filter_allowed_access_grants and call it in
create_calendar with the new sharing.public_calendars key, identical to
the channel router's pattern.
- routers/calendar.py: call filter_allowed_access_grants in update_calendar
too. The pre-existing owner-only gate at L350 only restricts WHO may
change grants; the new filter restricts WHICH grants they may set, so a
non-admin owner cannot make their own calendar publicly readable or
writable without the corresponding sharing permission.
Same shape as GHSA-7rjh-px4v-5w55 (channels). Reported by Matteo Panzeri.
Co-authored-by: Matteo Panzeri <28739806+matte1782@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: expose public_calendars + features.calendar through admin permissions surface
The earlier commit added DEFAULT_USER_PERMISSIONS['sharing']['public_calendars']
and the runtime filter call, but the new key was not yet plumbed through the
admin /users/default/permissions endpoint. Without these changes the toggle
would round-trip as silently dropped:
- routers/users.py SharingPermissions: any payload POSTed to
/default/permissions ran through `form_data.model_dump()`, and Pydantic
drops fields not declared on the model. The new public_calendars key
would have been stripped on every save, leaving admins unable to grant
the permission via the UI even though the runtime filter would honor it.
- src/lib/constants/permissions.ts: the frontend's DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS dict
is the seed shape used by the admin Groups Permissions panel; without
the new key it could not bind a Switch component to it.
- Permissions.svelte: add a Calendars Public Sharing toggle alongside the
Notes/Chats Public Sharing toggles, gated on the existing
features.calendar flag (matches the pattern used for notes/chats).
Also closes a pre-existing parity gap on features.calendar: DEFAULT_USER_
PERMISSIONS['features']['calendar'] has existed since the calendar feature
shipped, and Permissions.svelte already renders a Calendar feature toggle,
but FeaturesPermissions Pydantic and the frontend defaults never knew
about it. Adding it everywhere completes the round-trip so admin saves no
longer silently drop the calendar feature flag either.
---------
Co-authored-by: Matteo Panzeri <28739806+matte1782@users.noreply.github.com>
* refac(routers): reject external URLs in profile/model image handlers
* refac(ui): centralize image URL validation in safeImageUrl helper
* refac(auths): make signout POST-only
* refac: gate external profile image redirect behind ENABLE_PROFILE_IMAGE_URL_FORWARDING
Restore the 302 redirect for external http(s) profile image URLs in
the user and model profile-image endpoints, but gate it behind a new
ENABLE_PROFILE_IMAGE_URL_FORWARDING env flag (default: True).
Existing deployments that rely on external profile image forwarding
continue to work unchanged. Operators who want to suppress the
redirect (to prevent client-side IP/UA/Referer leaks) can set the
flag to False.
