routers/openai.py and routers/ollama.py decorated get_all_models with
`@cached(key=lambda _, user: ...)`. In aiocache 0.12, `key=` is a STATIC
cache key: get_cache_key returns `self.key` verbatim (the lambda object)
without calling it, so every caller collides to ONE shared entry within
the TTL. The intended per-user namespacing never happened — one user's
permission-filtered model list could be served to another user (or an
anonymous caller) during the cache window.
The per-call hook is `key_builder=` (called as key_builder(func, *args,
**kwargs)). Switch both sites to key_builder with a (func, request,
user=None) signature so the key is built per call. user=None mirrors
ollama's optional-user signature and stays correct whether user is passed
positionally, as a kwarg, or omitted.
Verified offline: old form returns the same key object for distinct users
(collision); new form yields distinct openai_all_models_<id> /
ollama_all_models_<id> keys, and the unauthenticated base key when no user.
These two were the only @cached(key=lambda ...) sites in the backend.
The Ollama model upload and download handlers perform three stages
of sync file I/O on multi-GB model files inside async handlers:
1. Persist upload — file.file.read() + write() in a loop
2. SHA-256 hash — calculate_sha256() reads the file sequentially
3. Read for blob push — open().read() loads entire model into memory
All three stages block the event loop for the duration of the I/O.
For a 4GB model, each stage freezes the event loop for 10+ seconds
while every other user's request stalls.
Wrap each blocking stage in asyncio.to_thread() in both handlers:
- upload_model(): persist upload, calculate_sha256, blob read
- download_file_stream(): calculate_sha256, blob read
Benchmark (full pipeline: write + SHA-256 + read back, 3 trials):
- 200MB: max jitter 145ms → 1ms (145x improvement)
- 500MB: max jitter 1,026ms → 1ms (1,026x improvement)
File I/O is pure I/O — no GIL contention. asyncio.to_thread()
completely eliminates event loop blocking.
GET /api/v1/channels/{id}/messages/{message_id}/thread authorized only the URL channel, but get_messages_by_parent_id() appended the thread parent (loaded by id) without checking it belonged to that channel, so a caller could read a message from a channel they cannot access by passing its id as the thread root. Require the parent to be in the requested channel before returning it, and reject a posted parent_id/reply_to_id that does not belong to the channel.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Wrap get_content_from_url() in asyncio.to_thread() inside
get_sources_from_items() to prevent sync requests.get() from blocking
the event loop when users attach URL sources to chat messages.
The same function was already properly wrapped at retrieval.py:1839.
- Wrap hashlib.sha256(contents).hexdigest() in asyncio.to_thread()
inside upload_file_handler() to prevent CPU-bound hashing from
blocking the event loop during file uploads (44ms/100MB, scales
linearly with file size).
validate_url() calls socket.getaddrinfo() for SSRF protection, which
blocks the event loop for 100-700ms per DNS lookup. This affects:
- Image generation (get_image_data) — every external image URL
- Image editing (load_url_image) — every external image URL
- OAuth profile pictures (_process_picture_url) — every login
- Webhook delivery (post_webhook) — every notification
- Image base64 conversion (get_image_base64_from_url) — chat images
Wrap all 5 async call sites in asyncio.to_thread() so DNS resolution
runs in the thread pool. The event loop remains free to serve other
requests during the lookup.
Benchmark (3 domains, 3 trials averaged):
- BEFORE: max jitter 479ms, 1 blocked ping per trial
- AFTER: max jitter 1ms, 0 blocked pings (324x improvement)
Co-authored-by: Tim Baek <tim@openwebui.com>
The Azure TTS handler (_tts_azure) interpolated the user-supplied voice,
and the locale derived from it, into the SSML xml:lang and <voice name>
attributes without XML-escaping, while the text body was already escaped
(2e75c6dbd). Escape both attributes too, so every user-derived value in
the SSML document is consistently encoded.
Co-authored-by: alanturing881 <alanturing881@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace per-message database queries with batch IN-clause queries in
channel message handlers. This eliminates the N+1 query pattern that
caused ~102 queries per channel page load (50 messages × 2 queries each).
Changes:
- Add get_reactions_by_message_ids() to MessageTable: single query
fetches all reactions for multiple messages using IN clause with
User JOIN, returns dict[message_id, list[Reactions]]
- Add get_thread_reply_counts_by_message_ids() to MessageTable: single
GROUP BY aggregate query returns (count, max_created_at) per parent,
replacing full object loads just to call len()
- Refactor get_channel_messages(): 102 → 4 queries per page
- Refactor get_pinned_channel_messages(): 22 → 3 queries per page
- Refactor get_channel_thread_messages(): 53 → 4 queries per page
- Refactor send_notification(): N+1 membership check → batch set lookup
pydub imports the stdlib `audioop`, removed in Python 3.13, so audio
preprocessing would break there. requires-python is already capped at
< 3.13; this one-line pointer flags what to handle (audioop-lts, or drop
pydub) before raising that cap.
The direct image-edit route was the only image-edit surface with no authorization: it ran
on get_verified_user alone, while POST /generations enforces ENABLE_IMAGE_GENERATION +
features.image_generation and the built-in edit_image tool enforces ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT +
features.image_generation. A verified non-admin user could therefore reach the configured
image-edit provider (spending IMAGES_EDIT_OPENAI_API_KEY) even when the administrator had
globally disabled image editing (ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False) or denied the user image
generation.
Split the route from the shared impl (mirroring generate_images/image_generations): the new
/edit wrapper enforces ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT and the per-user image-generation permission, then
delegates to image_edits(). The internal callers (the edit_image tool and the chat
middleware) already gate themselves and call image_edits() directly, so they are unaffected.
Co-authored-by: jagstack <52110932+jagstack@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a 'Reset to Defaults' button to both the Edit Default Permissions
modal and the Edit User Group permissions modal.
- Default permissions modal: resets to stock/env-var configuration
- User group modal: resets to current global default permissions
Backend: new GET /api/v1/users/default/permissions/defaults endpoint
that returns DEFAULT_USER_PERMISSIONS (env-var-based initial defaults).
ws_terminal() interpolated the path parameter session_id directly into the upstream
terminal WebSocket URL and then appended ?user_id=<caller>, with no encoding or
validation (the HTTP sibling proxy_terminal runs _sanitize_proxy_path; this path ran
nothing). An encoded '?'/'&' smuggled through session_id survives Open WebUI's single
decode and is re-decoded by the upstream, injecting an attacker-chosen user_id ahead
of the appended one. Query parsing binds the first occurrence, so the orchestrator
resolves the spoofed user's terminal scope, letting a normal authenticated user
present another user's identity to the upstream (CWE-116/863).
Encode session_id as an opaque path segment with urllib.parse.quote(session_id,
safe=''). This neutralises '?'/'#'/'&' at any decode depth (the upstream's single
decode reverses only the quote, leaving the original delimiters inert as path
content), while legitimate UUID session ids pass through unchanged. The appended
user_id is then the only query parameter the upstream binds.
The separate concern that the forwarded identity is a bearer claim with no integrity
binding spans Open WebUI and the upstream terminal server and is not addressed here.
Co-authored-by: rexpository <30176934+rexpository@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The SCIM update_user (PUT) and patch_user (PATCH) handlers mapped the SCIM active field
unconditionally onto the role column (role = 'user' if active else 'pending'), so a routine
IdP sync or a misconfigured IdP that marked a locally-provisioned admin inactive would
silently strip that admin's role and could lock an instance out of its own administration.
Gate both active->role assignments on user.role != 'admin' so SCIM provisioning can
activate/deactivate ordinary users but never demotes an existing admin; admin role changes
continue to go through the dedicated admin endpoints. SCIM already cannot promote to admin
(active only maps to user/pending), so this is symmetric.
Credit to @HOHK0923 for surfacing the admin-demotion footgun.
Co-authored-by: HOHK0923 <118590749+HOHK0923@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Timothy Jaeryang Baek