fix: enable DTLS peer verification against Samsung OCF Root CA

Bundle certs/ocf_root_ca.pem as samsung_appliance/ocf_root_ca.pem and
switch from SSL.VERIFY_NONE to SSL.VERIFY_PEER. The appliance's server
certificate must now chain to the Samsung Electronics OCF Root CA,
closing the ARP-spoof / MITM attack surface on the local network.

.gitignore: carve out explicit exception for the bundled public CA cert.

.gitignore

@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ certs/
 *.p12
 *.pfx
 *.key
+
+# Exception: bundled Samsung OCF Root CA (public cert, no key material)
+!samsung_appliance/ocf_root_ca.pem
 token.txt
 
 # Python artifacts

TODO_SECURITY.md

@@ -5,20 +5,12 @@ not malicious code — the repo is safe to run. Fix before exposing to untrusted
 
 ---
 
-## 1. DTLS Certificate Verification Disabled
+## 1. DTLS Certificate Verification Disabled ✅ RESOLVED
 
-**File:** `samsung_appliance/coap_dtls.py:228`
-**Severity:** High | **Category:** Authentication Bypass / Crypto
-
-The DTLS context uses `SSL.VERIFY_NONE` with a lambda that accepts any certificate.
-The bridge does not verify the appliance's identity.
-
-**Exploit:** LAN attacker ARP-spoofs the appliance IP, presents a self-signed cert,
-and either poisons state payloads (e.g. fake oven temp) or intercepts/drops commands.
-
-**Fix:** Use `SSL.VERIFY_PEER` + `ctx.load_verify_locations()` pointing to the Samsung
-CA cert already on disk. The `@SECLEVEL=0` SHA-1 workaround can coexist with peer
-verification — `VERIFY_NONE` is not required for it.
+`certs/ocf_root_ca.pem` (Samsung Electronics OCF Root CA) bundled at
+`samsung_appliance/ocf_root_ca.pem`. `coap_dtls.py` now uses
+`SSL.VERIFY_PEER` + `ctx.load_verify_locations(_OCF_ROOT_CA)`.
+ARP-spoof mitigation: the appliance's cert must chain to the Samsung OCF Root CA.
 
 ---
 

samsung_appliance/coap_dtls.py

@@ -23,9 +23,12 @@ import socket
 import struct
 import threading
 import time
+from pathlib import Path
 
 from OpenSSL import SSL
 
+_OCF_ROOT_CA = str(Path(__file__).parent / 'ocf_root_ca.pem')
+
 import logging
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -226,7 +229,8 @@ class DtlsCoapSession:
         """DTLS handshake. Blocks up to HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_S. Raises
         ConnectionError / TimeoutError on failure."""
         ctx = SSL.Context(SSL.DTLS_METHOD)
-        ctx.set_verify(SSL.VERIFY_NONE, lambda *_: True)
+        ctx.load_verify_locations(_OCF_ROOT_CA)
+        ctx.set_verify(SSL.VERIFY_PEER, lambda conn, cert, err, depth, ok: ok)
         ctx.set_cipher_list(b'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256')
         ctx.use_certificate_chain_file(self.cert_path)
         ctx.use_privatekey_file(self.key_path)

samsung_appliance/ocf_root_ca.pem

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----