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Author SHA1 Message Date
Tim Baek 3660bc00fd Merge pull request #24492 from open-webui/dev
0.9.5
2026-05-10 14:13:55 -04:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek 41b48b54aa doc: changelog 2026-05-11 02:54:22 +09:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek 4856ce48be chore: format 2026-05-11 02:51:59 +09:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek 0037baeb26 enh: channels streaming agent 2026-05-11 02:50:30 +09:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek c951b4f262 chore: format 2026-05-11 02:29:13 +09:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek 39777e35d8 doc: changelog 2026-05-11 02:28:38 +09:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek 15e696691c refac 2026-05-11 02:25:11 +09:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek 3a21b334cc refac 2026-05-11 02:15:46 +09:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek 2dbf7b6764 refac 2026-05-11 02:12:38 +09:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek 4a1064cefd refac 2026-05-11 02:04:09 +09:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek 315566064a refac 2026-05-11 01:57:50 +09:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek 3bba1c2270 feat: add IFRAME_CSP env var for srcdoc iframe content security policy
Adds an IFRAME_CSP environment variable that injects a Content-Security-Policy
<meta> tag into all srcdoc iframes rendering untrusted content:
- Artifacts (LLM-generated HTML previews)
- FullHeightIframe (tool/embed output)
- FilePreview (user-uploaded HTML files)
- CitationModal (RAG document HTML)

Shared utility in src/lib/utils/csp.ts handles injection with HTML-safe
attribute escaping. URL-based iframes (src=) are correctly excluded.

Env-var only — no PersistentConfig, no admin UI, no DB. Set once at deploy
time, requires restart. Empty string (default) means no CSP restriction.
2026-05-11 01:56:02 +09:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek 1388f4568b refac 2026-05-11 01:46:33 +09:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek d1ef538237 refac 2026-05-11 01:31:46 +09:00
Classic298andyantongggg fc94118b2d fix: prevent mass-assignment user_id spoofing in POST /api/v1/evaluations/feedback (#24508)
* fix: prevent mass-assignment user_id spoofing in POST /api/v1/evaluations/feedback

Two independent gaps in backend/open_webui/models/feedbacks.py let an
authenticated caller forge the `user_id` (and `id`, `version`) on a new
feedback record submitted to POST /api/v1/evaluations/feedback:

1. `FeedbackForm` declared `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='allow')`,
   so Pydantic preserved any extra fields supplied in the request body —
   including `user_id`, `id`, `version`. The form is the public input
   boundary for the endpoint and should not accept unknown fields.

2. In `insert_new_feedback`, the dict literal placed
   `**form_data.model_dump()` AFTER `'id': id`, `'user_id': user_id`,
   `'version': 0`. Python dict-literal duplicate-key resolution is
   last-wins, so any of those fields present in `form_data` overwrote
   the server-derived values.

Combined effect: a regular user could POST a feedback record with an
arbitrary `user_id`, attributing the rating to any other user. The Elo
leaderboard at backend/open_webui/routers/evaluations.py computes model
rankings from these records, and the admin export
(GET /api/v1/evaluations/feedbacks/export) and admin list
(GET /api/v1/evaluations/feedbacks/all) display the spoofed attribution.

Two fixes, defense-in-depth:

- FeedbackForm: switch `extra='allow'` to `extra='ignore'` so Pydantic
  drops unknown fields at parse time. Sub-models (RatingData / MetaData /
  SnapshotData) intentionally keep `extra='allow'` because their contents
  are deliberately schema-flexible — the spoofing surface was the form,
  not the sub-payloads.

- insert_new_feedback: spread `form_data.model_dump()` first, then
  overlay server-controlled fields (`id`, `user_id`, `version`,
  `created_at`, `updated_at`) so the explicit keys win on duplicate-key
  resolution regardless of what reaches the function. Matches the secure
  pattern already used in backend/open_webui/models/functions.py:120.

Reported by yantongggg in GHSA-rjmp-vjf2-qf4g. Same root-cause class as
the prior published GHSA-hr43-rjmr-7wmm (folder mass-assignment, fixed
in v0.9.0); that fix did not generalize across the codebase, this fix
closes the feedback variant.

Co-authored-by: yantongggg <yantongggg@users.noreply.github.com>

* chore: trim comments

---------

Co-authored-by: yantongggg <yantongggg@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-11 01:16:17 +09:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek 8d3133fe28 refac 2026-05-11 01:15:34 +09:00
d11e06f1b7 fix: prevent redirect-based SSRF and enforce collecton write access (#24524)
* fix: prevent redirect-based SSRF in get_image_base64_from_url

Cohort follow-up to PR #24491. That PR patched three call sites
(SafeWebBaseLoader._scrape, get_content_from_url, load_url_image) to
pass allow_redirects=False on the underlying HTTP client; this fourth
call site in utils/files.py was missed.

get_image_base64_from_url() is invoked from convert_url_images_to_base64
in utils/middleware.py on every /api/chat/completions request whose
message content includes an image_url part. validate_url() is called on
the originally-submitted URL only; the aiohttp session.get() call had
no allow_redirects argument and the shared session pool does not
override the aiohttp default (allow_redirects=True). An authenticated
user sending a chat message with image_url pointing at an attacker host
that 302-redirects to 169.254.169.254 / 127.0.0.1 / RFC1918 reached the
internal target. This is the most reachable variant in the redirect
cluster: no special endpoint, no admin permission, no feature flag.

Apply the same one-line fix as the other three call sites: pass
allow_redirects=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS (defaults to False).

Reported by nayakchinmohan in GHSA-88jq-grjp-jx6f; consolidated under
GHSA-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6.

Co-authored-by: nayakchinmohan <nayakchinmohan@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix: enforce collection write access on process_file endpoint

Cohort follow-up to ba83613ff. That commit added _validate_collection_access
to process_text and process_web (the user-supplied collection_name path)
but missed process_file in the same router.

process_file accepts a user-supplied collection_name and writes the file's
embedded content into that collection via save_docs_to_vector_db. The
file_id is gated by file ownership (line 1562) but collection_name was
unchecked, so an authenticated user could append content from a file they
own into another user's knowledge-base collection by passing the victim's
KB UUID as collection_name. Identical pattern to the process_text and
process_web gaps that ba83613ff closed.

Apply the same one-line gate as the sibling endpoints: when
collection_name is user-supplied (not the default file-{file.id} fallback),
require write access via _validate_collection_access. The shared validator
delegates to filter_accessible_collections, which already correctly
handles file-* prefixes (via has_access_to_file) and KB UUIDs
(via Knowledges.check_access_by_user_id) — admins bypass.

Reported by tenbbughunters (Tenable) in GHSA-4g37-7p2c-38r9 (the
comprehensive write-path filing covering process_text / process_file /
process_web / process_youtube and the _validate_collection_access UUID
root cause), and independently re-identified for the missed process_file
call site by kodareef5 in GHSA-4m74-3cmc-293g.

Co-authored-by: tenbbughunters <tenbbughunters@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: kodareef5 <kodareef5@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix: enforce collection write access on process_files_batch endpoint

Cohort follow-up to ba83613ff and the prior process_file fix on this
branch. process_files_batch (line 2604) is the third write endpoint in
the same router that accepts a user-supplied collection_name; it was
covered in the same Tenable filing as process_file and was missed by
the same cohort fix. The endpoint validates per-file ownership at line
2642 but does not check whether the caller has write access to the
target collection_name before save_docs_to_vector_db writes into it
at line 2683-2690 with add=True.

Apply the same one-line gate as the sibling endpoints. Validate only
when collection_name is user-supplied (truthy) so the existing fall
through behavior for the None case is unchanged.

Same Tenable / kodareef5 cohort as the previous commit.

Co-authored-by: tenbbughunters <tenbbughunters@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: kodareef5 <kodareef5@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: nayakchinmohan <nayakchinmohan@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: tenbbughunters <tenbbughunters@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: kodareef5 <kodareef5@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-11 01:09:15 +09:00
Classic298andKadirArslan 841c9045d7 fix: gate tool content updates behind workspace.tools to match create endpoint (#24513)
* fix: gate tool content updates behind workspace.tools to match create endpoint

`update_tools_by_id` (routers/tools.py:452) authorizes a caller as long as
they are the tool's owner, hold a `write` access grant on the tool, or are
an admin. This means a verified user who has been given a write grant on
a tool — typically as part of a metadata-collaboration workflow (edit
description, adjust valves, manage access grants) — can also overwrite
the tool's Python source. Because `load_tool_module_by_id` further down
calls `exec(content, module.__dict__)` at module-import time, anything
the new content puts outside the `class Tools:` body executes immediately
on the server with the worker's privileges (root in the default Docker
deployment).

The `create_new_tools` endpoint already requires
`workspace.tools` (or `workspace.tools_import`) precisely because creating
a tool means submitting executable code. The update endpoint did not
mirror that check, producing an asymmetric authorization surface in which
a write-grantee with no workspace permission can still reach the same
exec sink as a workspace.tools-trusted creator. SECURITY.md frames
`workspace.tools` as the trust signal an admin uses to delegate
code-execution capability; the previous behavior let that signal be
bypassed by a per-resource share.

Fix: after the existing ownership / write-grant / admin gate, add a
content-change check. If `form_data.content != tools.content`, require
`workspace.tools` or `workspace.tools_import` (or admin role). Metadata
edits — `name`, `description`, valves config, access grants — continue
to flow through the existing gate, so the legitimate share-for-
collaboration workflow is unaffected.

Reported by KadirArslan in GHSA-p4fx-23fq-jfg6 with a working three-user
PoC (Alice trusted with workspace.tools creates a tool and shares write
to Bob; Bob updates content and the new code runs as root inside the
container, with Burp Collaborator confirming outbound exfiltration).

Co-authored-by: KadirArslan <KadirArslan@users.noreply.github.com>

* chore: trim comment

---------

Co-authored-by: KadirArslan <KadirArslan@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-11 01:08:12 +09:00
Classic298 f5e110fbee fix: enforce message ownership in group/DM channel update + delete endpoints (#24506)
* fix: enforce message ownership in group/DM channel update + delete endpoints

`update_message_by_id` (channels.py:1348) and `delete_message_by_id`
(channels.py:1550) branch on `channel.type`. The `else` branch (standard
channels) correctly enforces `message.user_id != user.id` ownership before
mutating, but the `if channel.type in ['group', 'dm']` branch only checked
`is_user_channel_member` — channel membership alone, with no message
ownership verification.

Effect on group/DM channels: any verified member of the conversation could:

- overwrite another member's message content while the server preserved
  `user_id=victim`, producing tampered content that renders to other
  members as the original author's authentic post (integrity + authenticity);
- silently delete another member's messages, removing them from
  conversation history without trace (integrity).

Reproduced end-to-end against v0.9.4 with three users (attacker, victim,
viewer) sharing a group channel: attacker overwrites victim's message and
deletes another, viewer reads the tampered content as victim-authored.

Two patches, identical shape, mirror the `else` branch's existing
ownership semantics:

- `update_message_by_id` group/DM branch: add
  `if user.role != 'admin' and message.user_id != user.id: raise 403`
  immediately after the `is_user_channel_member` check.
- `delete_message_by_id` group/DM branch: same.

The standard-channel branch is unchanged (it already enforced ownership).
Admins remain able to moderate any message, matching the existing semantic
in the standard-channel branch.

Reports consolidated under GHSA-wwhq-cx22-f7vv (earliest live filing of the
group/DM-specific variant). Same gap previously surfaced and partially
fixed under GHSA-jxwr-g6r6-j3fx (which addressed the standard-channel
branch only) — this completes the cohort.

* chore: trim comments
2026-05-11 01:03:39 +09:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek e8e9141061 refac 2026-05-11 01:02:45 +09:00
Classic298andkikayli d3737176bc fix: require write permission for pin_channel_message on standard channels (#24521)
`pin_channel_message` (channels.py:1242) checked `permission='read'` on
the standard-channel branch before mutating `is_pinned` / `pinned_by` /
`pinned_at` via `Messages.update_is_pinned_by_id`. Pin/unpin is a write
operation; gating it on read access let any user with read-only channel
access pin or unpin any message in the channel, including admin posts.

One-character fix: change `permission='read'` to `permission='write'`.

Reported by kikayli in GHSA-5gc6-xhv4-2wg6.

Co-authored-by: kikayli <kikayli@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-11 00:59:50 +09:00
Classic298andbrodmart 2d9939ed49 chore: add validate_url() to get_image_data() for cohort consistency hardening (#24518)
* chore: add validate_url() to get_image_data() for cohort consistency hardening

`get_image_data()` in `backend/open_webui/routers/images.py` fetches the
URL returned by the configured image generation API directly via
`session.get(data)` without first calling `validate_url()`. The sibling
`load_url_image()` in the same file (called from /images/edit) calls
`validate_url(data)` first — that gate was added under
GHSA-jgx9-jr5x-mvpv. The two functions handle structurally identical
input (an attacker-or-server-supplied URL string) and should enforce the
same SSRF gate as a matter of code hygiene.

In the current call graph, the URL passed to `get_image_data()` comes
from the admin-configured image generation API's response, so an
exploitable SSRF chain additionally requires admin-side trust delegation
(misconfigured/untrusted upstream image API, or a custom
OpenAI-compatible server that reflects user input into response URLs).
That makes the missing call a defense-in-depth gap rather than a
vulnerability per SECURITY.md Rule 9 — a position the GHSA-h7cc-wwjp-5xqh
advisory is being closed under. This change is hardening: it brings the
two image-fetch helpers into alignment so any future caller that begins
passing user-influenced URLs into `get_image_data()` is gated by the
same private-IP / loopback / metadata-IP filter the rest of the
codebase enforces.

Surface raised by brodmart in GHSA-h7cc-wwjp-5xqh.

Co-authored-by: brodmart <brodmart@users.noreply.github.com>

* chore: trim comment

---------

Co-authored-by: brodmart <brodmart@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-11 00:59:32 +09:00
Classic298anddestination-one c66c273f62 fix: strip model params for read-only callers on per-id endpoint (#24525)
GET /api/v1/models/model?id=<model_id> at routers/models.py:412
returned the full model.model_dump() to any caller with read access,
including the params dict that holds the admin-curated system prompt
and other behavior config. The user-facing /api/models endpoint
already strips this via utils/models.py:170,210 with the comment
"Remove params to avoid exposing sensitive info", and /api/v1/models/list
gates by write permission so non-curators don't see the model in their
workspace listing at all. The per-id endpoint missed the same gate, so
a user with read-only access (e.g. granted access to use the model in
chat) could open /workspace/models/edit?id=<not-mine> in the browser
and read the system prompt verbatim from the network response, even
though saving was correctly blocked.

Compute write_access once at the top of the handler so it can serve
both the response-shape decision and the response field. When the
caller lacks write access, replace params with an empty dict in the
serialised response. Owners, admins under BYPASS_ADMIN_ACCESS_CONTROL,
and explicit write-grant holders still get the full payload so the
workspace edit UI keeps working for users who legitimately curate the
model.

Read-permission users continue to receive everything else they need to
chat with the model — the chat path resolves prompt/params server-side
from the stored ModelModel and never echoes them back through this
endpoint.

Reported by destination-one in GHSA-h2cw-7qw9-56xr.

Co-authored-by: destination-one <destination-one@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-11 00:59:08 +09:00
e7ba8978c6 fix: reject parser-confusing chars in validate_url to close SSRF bypass (#24534)
urllib.parse.urlparse and requests/aiohttp disagree on how to split URLs
containing backslash, tab, CR, or LF in or around the netloc. urlparse
treats backslash as part of userinfo and uses what follows '@' as the
host; requests treats backslash as the start of the path and connects
to whatever precedes it. The same URL therefore passes the private-IP
filter (urlparse sees a public host) but reaches an internal target
(requests connects to e.g. 127.0.0.1). End result is an SSRF that the
existing IP block list cannot catch because it's evaluating the wrong
host.

PoC: http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1 — urlparse hostname is 1.1.1.1
(global, passes), requests reaches 127.0.0.1 (loopback).

Reject up front any URL containing one of the four documented parser-
confusing characters before either parser gets a chance to interpret
it. None of these characters is valid in an unencoded URL (\ should
always be %5C, whitespace should be %09 / %0A / %0D), so this is a
pure defensive rejection with no legitimate-input false positives.

Reported by Fushuling and RacerZ-fighting in GHSA-8w7q-q5jp-jvgx.

Co-authored-by: Fushuling <Fushuling@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: RacerZ-fighting <RacerZ-fighting@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-11 00:57:48 +09:00
joaoback 5b13e3e3f0 i18n: add pt-BR translations for newly added UI items and consistency pass (#24503)
New **pt-BR** translations for items introduced in the latest releases, plus a consistency/quality pass across existing strings (grammar, tone, capitalization, pluralization). Placeholders and hotkeys preserved. No logic changes.
2026-05-11 00:57:18 +09:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek b0a56375d2 chore 2026-05-09 23:38:32 +09:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek 8689f7090f chore: format 2026-05-09 23:22:05 +09:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek 55535a8965 doc: changelog 2026-05-09 23:21:08 +09:00
Classic298 203ec29baf chore: remove unauthenticated dead-code GET /api/v1/retrieval/ status endpoint (#24497)
The `get_status()` handler at retrieval.py:263 (`@router.get('/')`) returned
the live RAG pipeline configuration (CHUNK_SIZE, CHUNK_OVERLAP, RAG_TEMPLATE,
RAG_EMBEDDING_ENGINE, RAG_EMBEDDING_MODEL, RAG_RERANKING_MODEL, etc.) without
any authentication dependency, while every adjacent endpoint on the same
router (/embedding, /embedding/update, /config, /config/update) requires
get_admin_user.

Exhaustive search of the repository confirms the endpoint has no callers:

- Frontend (src/): no `RETRIEVAL_API_BASE_URL}/'`-style fetch; the existing
  `getRAGConfig()` in src/lib/apis/retrieval/index.ts targets `/config`,
  not the root, and is the only consumer of admin-level retrieval state.
- Backend self-references: none.
- Cypress e2e (chat, documents, registration, settings): none.
- Backend tests (backend/open_webui/test/): none.
- Build/CI scripts (scripts/): none.
- Direct symbol import of `get_status` from this router: none.

The endpoint is dead code, almost certainly a relic from before the
/config GET split. Removing it has zero UX impact and eliminates the
unauthenticated-config-disclosure surface raised in advisory triage on
GHSA-65pg-qhhw-mxwg. External monitoring scripts that may have hit the
bare root will receive a 404 and can switch to the existing /config
endpoint, which returns the same fields plus the rest of the RAG config
under admin auth.

Surface raised by 0xRyuzak1 in GHSA-65pg-qhhw-mxwg. The advisory was closed
as not-a-vulnerability per SECURITY.md Rule 1 (no security boundary
crossed in default config — RAG_TEMPLATE default is a citation-format
instruction, not a system prompt; no integrity/availability impact); this
removal is independent code-hygiene that aligns the router cohort.

Reported-by: 0xRyuzak1 <https://github.com/0xRyuzak1>
2026-05-09 23:19:14 +09:00
Classic298andMatteo Panzeri 9918ab6265 fix: gate public sharing of skills behind sharing.public_skills on create/update (#24494)
The /create (L155-193) and /id/{id}/update (L248-297) endpoints in
routers/skills.py persisted form_data.access_grants directly to
AccessGrants.set_access_grants without filter_allowed_access_grants,
while every other shareable resource in the codebase (channels, knowledge,
models, notes, prompts, tools, calendars) and the dedicated
/id/{id}/access/update endpoint on this same router (L309-348) all do call
the filter. A user with workspace.skills permission (default False, but
admins can grant it to skill-creating users) could therefore attach
{"principal_type":"user","principal_id":"*","permission":"read"|"write"}
to the create or update payload and have it persisted unfiltered, bypassing
the sharing.public_skills gate that the rest of the cohort enforces.

Two changes:

- create_new_skill: call filter_allowed_access_grants with
  'sharing.public_skills' immediately before insert, after the existing
  permission check and ID-taken check.
- update_skill_by_id: call filter_allowed_access_grants with the same key
  after the access check, before form_data.model_dump() flows into
  Skills.update_skill_by_id. The pre-existing access check at L263-277 only
  restricts WHO may modify the skill; the new filter restricts WHICH grants
  they may set.

All supporting plumbing was already in place from prior PRs:
filter_allowed_access_grants is already imported at L22, the
USER_PERMISSIONS_WORKSPACE_SKILLS_ALLOW_PUBLIC_SHARING constant exists,
DEFAULT_USER_PERMISSIONS['sharing']['public_skills'] is wired up,
SharingPermissions.public_skills is in the Pydantic, and the admin UI
already renders the toggle. This is a pure 2-line router fix that closes
the cohort-consistency gap.

Same shape as the calendar fix in #24493, reported by Matteo Panzeri while
auditing the resource-cohort cohort during follow-up on #24493.

Co-authored-by: Matteo Panzeri <28739806+matte1782@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-09 23:19:03 +09:00
Classic298andMatteo Panzeri 8a0018cf96 fix: gate public sharing of calendars behind sharing.public_calendars permission (#24493)
* fix: gate public sharing of calendars behind sharing.public_calendars permission

The calendar router did not call filter_allowed_access_grants on either the
create or update endpoint, while every other shareable resource in the
codebase (channels, knowledge, models, notes, prompts, skills, tools) does.
A verified non-admin owner could therefore attach
`{"principal_type":"user","principal_id":"*","permission":"read"|"write"}`
to their own calendar in the create or update payload and have it persisted
unfiltered. Any other verified user with the (default-on) features.calendar
permission could then read or, for write grants, write events on it via the
existing /events* endpoints, bypassing the per-user sharing.public_<X>
permission gate the rest of the resource cohort enforces.

Three changes:

- config.py: add USER_PERMISSIONS_CALENDAR_ALLOW_PUBLIC_SHARING (default
  False, env-overridable) and surface it in DEFAULT_USER_PERMISSIONS
  ['sharing']['public_calendars'] so admins can grant it per group via the
  same UI used for notes/models/etc.
- routers/calendar.py: import filter_allowed_access_grants and call it in
  create_calendar with the new sharing.public_calendars key, identical to
  the channel router's pattern.
- routers/calendar.py: call filter_allowed_access_grants in update_calendar
  too. The pre-existing owner-only gate at L350 only restricts WHO may
  change grants; the new filter restricts WHICH grants they may set, so a
  non-admin owner cannot make their own calendar publicly readable or
  writable without the corresponding sharing permission.

Same shape as GHSA-7rjh-px4v-5w55 (channels). Reported by Matteo Panzeri.

Co-authored-by: Matteo Panzeri <28739806+matte1782@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix: expose public_calendars + features.calendar through admin permissions surface

The earlier commit added DEFAULT_USER_PERMISSIONS['sharing']['public_calendars']
and the runtime filter call, but the new key was not yet plumbed through the
admin /users/default/permissions endpoint. Without these changes the toggle
would round-trip as silently dropped:

- routers/users.py SharingPermissions: any payload POSTed to
  /default/permissions ran through `form_data.model_dump()`, and Pydantic
  drops fields not declared on the model. The new public_calendars key
  would have been stripped on every save, leaving admins unable to grant
  the permission via the UI even though the runtime filter would honor it.
- src/lib/constants/permissions.ts: the frontend's DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS dict
  is the seed shape used by the admin Groups Permissions panel; without
  the new key it could not bind a Switch component to it.
- Permissions.svelte: add a Calendars Public Sharing toggle alongside the
  Notes/Chats Public Sharing toggles, gated on the existing
  features.calendar flag (matches the pattern used for notes/chats).

Also closes a pre-existing parity gap on features.calendar: DEFAULT_USER_
PERMISSIONS['features']['calendar'] has existed since the calendar feature
shipped, and Permissions.svelte already renders a Calendar feature toggle,
but FeaturesPermissions Pydantic and the frontend defaults never knew
about it. Adding it everywhere completes the round-trip so admin saves no
longer silently drop the calendar feature flag either.

---------

Co-authored-by: Matteo Panzeri <28739806+matte1782@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-09 23:18:51 +09:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek 69270e1c9e doc: changelog 2026-05-09 21:08:07 +09:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek 2e71b3fbb8 chore: format 2026-05-09 21:07:08 +09:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek df42d96c95 refac 2026-05-09 21:05:49 +09:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek 2fa3b84241 chore: bump 2026-05-09 21:04:52 +09:00
Classic298 8854541508 fix: prevent redirect-based SSRF in web-fetch and image-load call sites (#24491)
validate_url() in retrieval/web/utils.py only validates the initial URL.
The HTTP clients used downstream (sync requests, sync requests via the
parent WebBaseLoader._scrape, aiohttp via load_url_image) followed 3xx
redirects by default and did not re-validate the redirect target against
the private-IP / metadata-IP block list. An authenticated user could
submit a public URL that 302-redirected to an internal address (RFC1918,
127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, etc.) and the redirected response was returned
to them, enabling SSRF reads of internal services and cloud metadata.

Three call sites needed allow_redirects=False to match the policy already
enforced on the async _fetch() path:

- SafeWebBaseLoader: override requests_kwargs in __init__ so that the
  inherited synchronous _scrape() path passes allow_redirects=False to
  self.session.get() (the parent WebBaseLoader uses requests' default
  allow_redirects=True).
- get_content_from_url (retrieval/utils.py): pass allow_redirects=False
  on the streamed requests.get(...) call.
- load_url_image (routers/images.py, image-edits endpoint): pass
  allow_redirects=False on the aiohttp session.get(...) call.

Reports consolidated under GHSA-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6:
- GHSA-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6 (tenbbughunters / Tenable) - sync _scrape
- GHSA-5vxg-6gmv-m2qr (YLChen-007) - load_url_image
- GHSA-hf76-c83f-63w2 (tempcollab) - aiohttp _fetch (already fixed)
- GHSA-h55f-h5fh-mvm4 (sneaXOR) - get_content_from_url
2026-05-09 21:01:45 +09:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek 793e628ac3 refac 2026-05-09 20:59:29 +09:00
Classic298 a0268e51fc Merge pull request #24486 from Classic298/fix/notes-is-pinned-typeerror
fix: notes is_pinned TypeError on create/get
2026-05-09 20:56:06 +09:00
109 changed files with 1056 additions and 353 deletions
+1
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@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ The most impactful way to contribute to Open WebUI is through well-written bug r
**Before submitting, make sure you've checked the following:**
- [ ] **Linked Issue/Discussion:** This PR references an existing [Issue](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/issues) or [Discussion](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/discussions) — `Closes #___` / `Relates to #___`. If one does not exist, create one first. PRs without a linked issue or discussion may be closed without review.
- [ ] **Target branch:** Verify that the pull request targets the `dev` branch. **PRs targeting `main` will be immediately closed.**
- [ ] **Description:** Provide a concise description of the changes made in this pull request down below.
- [ ] **Changelog:** Ensure a changelog entry following the format of [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/) is added at the bottom of the PR description.
+36
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@@ -5,6 +5,42 @@ All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
## [0.9.5] - 2026-05-09
### Added
- 🛡️ **Redirect-based SSRF protection.** All outbound HTTP requests now block 3xx redirects by default via a new `AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS` environment variable, preventing redirect-based SSRF where a public URL silently redirects to internal addresses (RFC 1918, loopback, cloud-metadata endpoints). Affected call sites include web fetch, image loading, OAuth discovery, tool server execution, and code interpreter login. [#24491](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/24491)
- 🛡️ **Iframe content security policy.** Administrators can now configure a Content-Security-Policy for all srcdoc iframes (Artifacts, tool embeds, file previews, citation modals) via the `IFRAME_CSP` environment variable, restricting what LLM-generated or user-uploaded HTML can load and execute inside previews. [Commit](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/3bba1c227059a44c7eeefa97b8c69a63bf4f3454)
- 🎛️ **Granular markdown rendering controls.** Users can now independently disable Markdown rendering for user messages and assistant responses from Interface settings, preventing unintended formatting when pasting text that contains Markdown-sensitive characters. [Commit](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/4a1064cefd6f48a8b3b02cd31f77838c8802b635)
- 🔧 **Terminal proxy response headers.** Administrators can now inject custom response headers into terminal proxy responses via the `TERMINAL_PROXY_HEADERS` environment variable (JSON object), enabling deployment-specific security headers like sandbox policies for proxied content. [Commit](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/8d3133fe2835122bffaa4f2ce584730bc9c78981)
- 🔌 **Channel streaming and tool support.** Mentioning a model in a Channel now streams responses in real time and supports the full chat completion pipeline, including native and default function calling, built-in tools (web search, image generation), user tools, MCP tools, filters, and RAG knowledge injection — the same capabilities available in standard chats.
### Fixed
- 📝 **Notes create and open reliability.** Creating new notes and opening existing notes no longer fails with a TypeError caused by `is_pinned` being passed to the SQLAlchemy model on create, and passed twice to `NoteResponse` on read. [#24484](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/issues/24484), [#24486](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/24486)
- 🔐 **Skill public sharing permission enforcement.** Creating or updating skills now filters access grants through the `sharing.public_skills` permission, preventing non-admin users from making skills publicly accessible without the required permission. [#24494](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/24494)
- 🔐 **Calendar public sharing permission enforcement.** Creating or updating calendars now filters access grants through a new `sharing.public_calendars` permission, preventing users from making calendars publicly readable or writable without explicit admin-granted sharing permission. [#24493](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/24493)
- 🔐 **Feedback user attribution spoofing.** Submitting evaluation feedback can no longer forge the `user_id` field through mass-assignment, preventing authenticated users from attributing ratings to other users and corrupting Elo leaderboard rankings and admin feedback exports. [#24508](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/24508)
- 🛡️ **Image URL redirect-based SSRF.** Chat messages containing image URLs no longer follow 3xx redirects to internal addresses during base64 conversion, closing the most reachable redirect-based SSRF variant that required no special permissions or feature flags. [#24524](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/24524)
- 🛡️ **Collection write access on file processing.** The `process_file` and `process_files_batch` retrieval endpoints now enforce collection write-access checks before embedding content, preventing authenticated users from injecting file content into another user's knowledge-base collection. [#24524](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/24524)
- 🔐 **Tool source code update authorization.** Updating a tool's Python source code now requires `workspace.tools` or `workspace.tools_import` permission, preventing users with only a write-access grant from overwriting executable tool code while still allowing metadata edits. [#24513](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/24513)
- 🔐 **Channel message ownership enforcement.** Updating or deleting messages in group and DM channels now requires message ownership, preventing channel members from tampering with or silently removing other members' messages. [#24506](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/24506)
- 🔐 **Channel pin write permission.** Pinning and unpinning messages on standard channels now requires write permission instead of read permission, preventing read-only users from modifying pinned content. [#24521](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/24521)
- 🛡️ **Image generation URL validation.** Generated image URLs are now validated through `validate_url()` before fetching, aligning the defense-in-depth posture with sibling image-loading paths. [#24518](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/24518)
- 🔐 **Model params exposure for read-only users.** The per-model API endpoint now strips the `params` dict (including system prompts) from responses to callers without write access, preventing read-only users from viewing admin-curated model configuration. [#24525](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/24525)
- 🛡️ **URL parser SSRF bypass.** URL validation now rejects backslash, tab, CR, and LF characters that cause urllib and requests/aiohttp to disagree on the target host, closing a parser-confusion SSRF bypass. [#24534](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/24534)
- 🛡️ **Profile image MIME-type allowlist.** Serving profile images from data URIs now enforces a strict MIME-type allowlist (PNG, JPEG, GIF, WEBP by default, configurable via `PROFILE_IMAGE_ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES`) and sets `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, preventing stored-XSS through SVG or other executable content types. [Commit](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/15e696691cad98692c329de62ed8a5bdb3a26d4e)
- 🔐 **File ownership in folder and knowledge attachments.** Attaching files to folders or knowledge bases now verifies per-file read access, and folder file lists in chat middleware are filtered to entries the caller can read, preventing unauthorized file content from being injected into RAG context. [Commit](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/2dbf7b6764a7922458d3b0139687ad6dcd7596d9)
- 🔐 **Shared chat access for owners and admins.** Chat owners can now view and clone their own shared chats without requiring an explicit access grant, and administrators can manage shared chat access controls on any chat. [Commit](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/3a21b334cce30226750c5c537345dc51bb8bef17), [Commit](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/315566064aedeff071854b023d09e5f1ea0eb950)
- 🧵 **Legacy chat history self-healing.** Loading legacy conversations now automatically detects broken parent-link graphs in migrated message records, merges missing messages from the embedded JSON history, and backfills them to the normalized table so future loads use the fast path without data loss. [Commit](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/1388f4568b8f508c26542673dd01f1fa049e798a)
- 🎛️ **Filter selector reactivity.** Model filter checkboxes now derive state reactively from the current filter list and selected IDs instead of capturing a one-time snapshot at mount, so checkboxes update correctly when model contexts or filter configurations change at runtime. [Commit](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/d1ef5382377f590f97a6dbaee88f369e6d7c5f6f)
- 🌐 **Portuguese (Brazil) translation updates.** Translations for newly added UI items were added along with a consistency pass across existing entries. [#24503](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/24503)
### Changed
- 🧹 **Removed unauthenticated retrieval status endpoint.** The unauthenticated `GET /api/v1/retrieval/` status endpoint has been removed as dead code — retrieval configuration is already available through authenticated admin endpoints. [#24497](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/24497)
- 📋 **PR template issue requirement.** Pull requests now require a linked Issue or Discussion reference, ensuring better traceability for all contributions. PRs without a linked issue or discussion may be closed without review.
## [0.9.4] - 2026-05-09
### Fixed
+1 -1
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@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ ENV APP_BUILD_HASH=${BUILD_HASH}
RUN npm run build
######## WebUI backend ########
FROM python:3.11.14-slim-bookworm AS base
FROM python:3.11-slim-bookworm AS base
# Use args
ARG USE_CUDA
+11
View File
@@ -1226,6 +1226,11 @@ TERMINAL_SERVER_CONNECTIONS = PersistentConfig(
terminal_server_connections,
)
try:
TERMINAL_PROXY_HEADERS = json.loads(os.environ.get('TERMINAL_PROXY_HEADERS', '{}'))
except Exception:
TERMINAL_PROXY_HEADERS = {}
####################################
# WEBUI
####################################
@@ -1371,6 +1376,7 @@ RESPONSE_WATERMARK = PersistentConfig(
os.environ.get('RESPONSE_WATERMARK', ''),
)
IFRAME_CSP = os.environ.get('IFRAME_CSP', '')
USER_PERMISSIONS_WORKSPACE_MODELS_ACCESS = (
os.environ.get('USER_PERMISSIONS_WORKSPACE_MODELS_ACCESS', 'False').lower() == 'true'
@@ -1465,6 +1471,10 @@ USER_PERMISSIONS_NOTES_ALLOW_PUBLIC_SHARING = (
os.environ.get('USER_PERMISSIONS_NOTES_ALLOW_PUBLIC_SHARING', 'False').lower() == 'true'
)
USER_PERMISSIONS_CALENDAR_ALLOW_PUBLIC_SHARING = (
os.environ.get('USER_PERMISSIONS_CALENDAR_ALLOW_PUBLIC_SHARING', 'False').lower() == 'true'
)
USER_PERMISSIONS_ACCESS_GRANTS_ALLOW_USERS = (
os.environ.get('USER_PERMISSIONS_ACCESS_GRANTS_ALLOW_USERS', 'True').lower() == 'true'
)
@@ -1585,6 +1595,7 @@ DEFAULT_USER_PERMISSIONS = {
'notes': USER_PERMISSIONS_NOTES_ALLOW_SHARING,
'public_notes': USER_PERMISSIONS_NOTES_ALLOW_PUBLIC_SHARING,
'public_chats': USER_PERMISSIONS_CHAT_ALLOW_PUBLIC_SHARING,
'public_calendars': USER_PERMISSIONS_CALENDAR_ALLOW_PUBLIC_SHARING,
},
'access_grants': {
'allow_users': USER_PERMISSIONS_ACCESS_GRANTS_ALLOW_USERS,
+16
View File
@@ -260,6 +260,15 @@ ENABLE_EASTER_EGGS = os.environ.get('ENABLE_EASTER_EGGS', 'True').lower() == 'tr
# controlled origins) and fall through to the default image instead.
ENABLE_PROFILE_IMAGE_URL_FORWARDING = os.environ.get('ENABLE_PROFILE_IMAGE_URL_FORWARDING', 'True').lower() == 'true'
PROFILE_IMAGE_ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES = frozenset(
t.strip()
for t in os.environ.get(
'PROFILE_IMAGE_ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES',
'image/png,image/jpeg,image/gif,image/webp',
).split(',')
if t.strip()
)
####################################
# WEBUI_BUILD_HASH
####################################
@@ -824,6 +833,13 @@ else:
AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL = os.environ.get('AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL', 'True').lower() == 'true'
# When False (default), outbound HTTP requests do not follow 3xx redirects.
# This prevents redirect-based SSRF where a public URL 302-redirects to an
# internal address (RFC 1918, loopback, cloud-metadata 169.254.169.254).
# Set to True only if your deployment requires redirect following and you
# have other SSRF protections in place (e.g. egress firewall).
AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS = os.environ.get('AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS', 'False').lower() == 'true'
AIOHTTP_CLIENT_TIMEOUT_MODEL_LIST = os.environ.get(
'AIOHTTP_CLIENT_TIMEOUT_MODEL_LIST',
os.environ.get('AIOHTTP_CLIENT_TIMEOUT_OPENAI_MODEL_LIST', '10'),
+8 -4
View File
@@ -460,6 +460,7 @@ from open_webui.config import (
OAUTH_PROVIDERS,
WEBUI_URL,
RESPONSE_WATERMARK,
IFRAME_CSP,
# Admin
ENABLE_ADMIN_CHAT_ACCESS,
ENABLE_ADMIN_ANALYTICS,
@@ -1795,7 +1796,9 @@ async def chat_completion(
if metadata.get('chat_id') and user:
chat_id = metadata['chat_id']
if not chat_id.startswith('local:'): # temporary chats are not stored
if not chat_id.startswith('local:') and not chat_id.startswith(
'channel:'
): # temporary/channel chats are not stored
if is_new_chat:
# Build the full history upfront with ALL assistant placeholders
user_message = metadata.get('user_message') or {}
@@ -2011,7 +2014,7 @@ async def chat_completion(
if metadata.get('chat_id') and metadata.get('message_id'):
# Update the chat message with the error
try:
if not metadata['chat_id'].startswith('local:'):
if not metadata['chat_id'].startswith('local:') and not metadata['chat_id'].startswith('channel:'):
await Chats.upsert_message_to_chat_by_id_and_message_id(
metadata['chat_id'],
metadata['message_id'],
@@ -2274,7 +2277,7 @@ async def list_tasks_endpoint(request: Request, user=Depends(get_admin_user)):
@app.get('/api/tasks/chat/{chat_id:path}')
async def list_tasks_by_chat_id_endpoint(request: Request, chat_id: str, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):
if chat_id.startswith('local:'):
if chat_id.startswith('local:') or chat_id.startswith('channel:'):
socket_id = chat_id[len('local:') :]
owner_id = get_user_id_from_session_pool(socket_id)
if owner_id != user.id and user.role != 'admin':
@@ -2292,7 +2295,7 @@ async def list_tasks_by_chat_id_endpoint(request: Request, chat_id: str, user=De
@app.post('/api/tasks/chat/{chat_id:path}/stop')
async def stop_tasks_by_chat_id_endpoint(request: Request, chat_id: str, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):
if chat_id.startswith('local:'):
if chat_id.startswith('local:') or chat_id.startswith('channel:'):
socket_id = chat_id[len('local:') :]
owner_id = get_user_id_from_session_pool(socket_id)
if owner_id != user.id and user.role != 'admin':
@@ -2444,6 +2447,7 @@ async def get_app_config(request: Request):
'pending_user_overlay_title': app.state.config.PENDING_USER_OVERLAY_TITLE,
'pending_user_overlay_content': app.state.config.PENDING_USER_OVERLAY_CONTENT,
'response_watermark': app.state.config.RESPONSE_WATERMARK,
'iframe_csp': IFRAME_CSP,
},
'license_metadata': app.state.LICENSE_METADATA,
**(
+68 -5
View File
@@ -459,24 +459,87 @@ class ChatTable:
return None
return row[0] or 'New Chat'
@staticmethod
def get_unresolved_parent_ids(messages_map: dict) -> set[str]:
"""Return parent IDs referenced by messages but absent from the map.
An empty set means the message graph is fully connected.
"""
return {
msg['parentId']
for msg in messages_map.values()
if msg.get('parentId') and msg['parentId'] not in messages_map
}
async def backfill_messages_by_chat_id(self, chat_id: str, user_id: str, messages: dict[str, dict]) -> None:
"""Write messages to the ``chat_message`` table so future lookups
use the fast path. Errors are logged but never raised.
"""
for message_id, message in messages.items():
if not isinstance(message, dict) or not message.get('role'):
continue
try:
await ChatMessages.upsert_message(
message_id=message_id,
chat_id=chat_id,
user_id=user_id,
data=message,
)
except Exception as e:
log.warning('Backfill failed for message %s in chat %s: %s', message_id, chat_id, e)
async def get_messages_map_by_chat_id(self, id: str) -> Optional[dict]:
"""Message map for walking history (see ``get_message_list``).
Prefer ``chat_message`` rows to avoid loading the large ``chat``
JSON blob; fall back to embedded history when no rows exist
(legacy chats).
Prefer ``chat_message`` rows to avoid loading the large embedded
history; fall back to the legacy JSON when no rows exist.
When rows exist but the parent-link graph has gaps (e.g. migration
failures), missing messages are merged from the legacy history
and backfilled so future requests self-heal.
"""
# Fast path: build from normalized chat_message rows.
messages_map = await ChatMessages.get_messages_map_by_chat_id(id)
if messages_map is not None:
unresolved_ids = self.get_unresolved_parent_ids(messages_map)
if not unresolved_ids:
return messages_map
# Graph has gaps — enrich from the legacy embedded history.
log.info(
'Chat %s: %d unresolved parent reference(s) in chat_message — enriching from legacy history',
id,
len(unresolved_ids),
)
chat = await self.get_chat_by_id(id)
if chat:
history_messages = chat.chat.get('history', {}).get('messages', {}) or {}
missing_messages = {
message_id: history_messages[message_id]
for message_id in unresolved_ids
if message_id in history_messages
}
if missing_messages:
messages_map.update(missing_messages)
# Backfill so future requests use the fast path.
await self.backfill_messages_by_chat_id(id, chat.user_id, missing_messages)
return messages_map
# No rows — fall back to the embedded JSON blob for legacy chats.
# No rows — fall back to the legacy embedded history.
chat = await self.get_chat_by_id(id)
if chat is None:
return None
return chat.chat.get('history', {}).get('messages', {}) or {}
history_messages = chat.chat.get('history', {}).get('messages', {}) or {}
# Backfill so future requests use the fast path.
if history_messages:
await self.backfill_messages_by_chat_id(id, chat.user_id, history_messages)
return history_messages
async def get_message_by_id_and_message_id(self, id: str, message_id: str) -> Optional[dict]:
chat = await self.get_chat_by_id(id)
+4 -2
View File
@@ -103,7 +103,8 @@ class FeedbackForm(BaseModel):
data: Optional[RatingData] = None
meta: Optional[dict] = None
snapshot: Optional[SnapshotData] = None
model_config = ConfigDict(extra='allow')
# ignore: drop client-supplied id/user_id/version/timestamps at parse time.
model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore')
class UserResponse(BaseModel):
@@ -145,12 +146,13 @@ class FeedbackTable:
) -> Optional[FeedbackModel]:
async with get_async_db_context(db) as db:
id = str(uuid.uuid4())
# Spread form_data first so server-controlled fields win on duplicate keys.
feedback = FeedbackModel(
**{
**form_data.model_dump(),
'id': id,
'user_id': user_id,
'version': 0,
**form_data.model_dump(),
'created_at': int(time.time()),
'updated_at': int(time.time()),
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ class NoteTable:
}
)
new_note = Note(**note.model_dump(exclude={'access_grants'}))
new_note = Note(**note.model_dump(exclude={'access_grants', 'is_pinned'}))
db.add(new_note)
await db.commit()
+6 -1
View File
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ from open_webui.retrieval.loaders.youtube import YoutubeLoader
from open_webui.env import (
AIOHTTP_CLIENT_TIMEOUT,
AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS,
OFFLINE_MODE,
ENABLE_FORWARD_USER_INFO_HEADERS,
AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL,
@@ -180,8 +181,12 @@ def get_content_from_url(request, url: str) -> str:
validate_url(url)
# Streamed GET to check Content-Type without downloading the body.
# allow_redirects=False prevents redirect-based SSRF: validate_url() above is
# called on the originally-submitted URL only; following 3xx redirects without
# re-validation would let an attacker reach private IPs (RFC1918, loopback,
# cloud-metadata 169.254.169.254) via a public host that redirects internally.
try:
response = requests.get(url, stream=True, timeout=30)
response = requests.get(url, stream=True, timeout=30, allow_redirects=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS)
response.raise_for_status()
content_type = response.headers.get('Content-Type', '')
except Exception:
+21 -2
View File
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ from open_webui.config import (
WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST,
)
from open_webui.utils.misc import is_string_allowed
from open_webui.env import AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL
from open_webui.env import AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL, AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -69,6 +69,14 @@ def validate_url(url: Union[str, Sequence[str]]):
if isinstance(validators.url(url), validators.ValidationError):
raise ValueError(ERROR_MESSAGES.INVALID_URL)
# Reject parser-confusing chars: urlparse and requests/aiohttp split
# on these differently, e.g. http://127.0.0.1\@1.1.1.1 → urlparse
# extracts 1.1.1.1 (public, passes filter) while requests connects
# to 127.0.0.1 (internal). Same shape with tab/CR/LF.
if any(ch in url for ch in ('\\', '\t', '\n', '\r')):
log.warning(f'Blocked URL with parser-confusing char: {url!r}')
raise ValueError(ERROR_MESSAGES.INVALID_URL)
parsed_url = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
# Protocol validation - only allow http/https
@@ -485,6 +493,17 @@ class SafeWebBaseLoader(WebBaseLoader):
"""
super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
self.trust_env = trust_env
# Prevent redirect-based SSRF on the synchronous _scrape() path.
# validate_url() is called once on the originally-submitted URL, but the
# parent WebBaseLoader's _scrape() invokes self.session.get(url, **self.requests_kwargs)
# which by default follows redirects. Without the override below, an attacker
# can submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address (RFC1918,
# 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, etc.) and the redirected target is fetched without
# re-validation. Matches the policy enforced on the async _fetch() path below.
self.requests_kwargs = {
**(self.requests_kwargs or {}),
'allow_redirects': AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS,
}
async def _fetch(self, url: str, retries: int = 3, cooldown: int = 2, backoff: float = 1.5) -> str:
async with aiohttp.ClientSession(trust_env=self.trust_env) as session:
@@ -502,7 +521,7 @@ class SafeWebBaseLoader(WebBaseLoader):
async with session.get(
url,
**(self.requests_kwargs | kwargs),
allow_redirects=False,
allow_redirects=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS,
) as response:
if self.raise_for_status:
response.raise_for_status()
+26 -1
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ from open_webui.models.access_grants import AccessGrants
from open_webui.models.groups import Groups
from open_webui.models.users import UserModel
from open_webui.utils.auth import get_verified_user
from open_webui.utils.access_control import has_permission
from open_webui.utils.access_control import has_permission, filter_allowed_access_grants
from open_webui.utils.calendar import expand_recurring_event
from open_webui.constants import ERROR_MESSAGES
@@ -112,6 +112,17 @@ async def get_calendars(request: Request, user: UserModel = Depends(get_verified
async def create_calendar(request: Request, form_data: CalendarForm, user: UserModel = Depends(get_verified_user)):
"""Create a new user calendar."""
await check_calendar_permission(request, user)
# Strip public/user grants the requesting user is not permitted to assign
# (matches the channel/notes/models pattern). Without this, any verified user
# could create a calendar with `principal_id='*' permission='read'|'write'`,
# making their events readable or writable by any other verified user.
form_data.access_grants = await filter_allowed_access_grants(
request.app.state.config.USER_PERMISSIONS,
user.id,
user.role,
form_data.access_grants,
'sharing.public_calendars',
)
return await Calendars.insert_new_calendar(user.id, form_data)
@@ -350,6 +361,20 @@ async def update_calendar(
if form_data.access_grants is not None and cal.user_id != user.id and user.role != 'admin':
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail='Only owner can manage sharing')
# Strip public/user grants the requesting user is not permitted to assign
# (matches the channel/notes/models pattern). The owner-only check above
# only restricts WHO can set grants; this filter restricts WHICH grants
# they may set, so a non-admin owner cannot make their calendar
# publicly readable/writable without the corresponding sharing permission.
if form_data.access_grants is not None:
form_data.access_grants = await filter_allowed_access_grants(
request.app.state.config.USER_PERMISSIONS,
user.id,
user.role,
form_data.access_grants,
'sharing.public_calendars',
)
updated = await Calendars.update_calendar_by_id(calendar_id, form_data)
if not updated:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail='Failed to update')
+40 -43
View File
@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ from open_webui.utils.models import (
get_all_models,
get_filtered_models,
)
from open_webui.utils.chat import generate_chat_completion
from open_webui.utils.auth import get_admin_user, get_verified_user
@@ -979,57 +978,48 @@ async def model_response_handler(request, channel, message, user, db=None):
],
]
# Resolve model config (same helpers automations use)
from open_webui.utils.automations import (
_resolve_model_tool_ids,
_resolve_model_features,
_resolve_model_filter_ids,
)
tool_ids = _resolve_model_tool_ids(request.app, model_id)
features = _resolve_model_features(request.app, model_id)
filter_ids = _resolve_model_filter_ids(request.app, model_id)
# Build full form_data — same shape as frontend POST.
# The channel: prefix routes pipeline events to the
# channel emitter in socket/main.py instead of the
# default chat emitter.
form_data = {
'model': model_id,
'messages': [
system_message,
{'role': 'user', 'content': content},
],
'stream': False,
'stream': True,
'chat_id': f'channel:{channel.id}',
'id': response_message.id,
'session_id': f'channel:{channel.id}',
'background_tasks': {},
}
if tool_ids:
form_data['tool_ids'] = tool_ids
if features:
form_data['features'] = features
if filter_ids:
form_data['filter_ids'] = filter_ids
res = await generate_chat_completion(
request,
form_data=form_data,
user=user,
)
# Call the full chat completion pipeline — streaming,
# tools, filters, RAG — everything. The pipeline runs as
# an async task; the channel emitter handles progressive
# message updates via socket events.
await request.app.state.CHAT_COMPLETION_HANDLER(request, form_data, user=user)
if res:
if res.get('choices', []) and len(res['choices']) > 0:
await update_message_by_id(
request,
channel.id,
response_message.id,
MessageForm(
**{
'content': res['choices'][0]['message']['content'],
'meta': {
'done': True,
},
}
),
user,
db,
)
elif res.get('error', None):
await update_message_by_id(
request,
channel.id,
response_message.id,
MessageForm(
**{
'content': f'Error: {res["error"]}',
'meta': {
'done': True,
},
}
),
user,
db,
)
except Exception as e:
log.info(e)
pass
log.exception(e)
return True
@@ -1256,7 +1246,8 @@ async def pin_channel_message(
if not await Channels.is_user_channel_member(channel.id, user.id, db=db):
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.DEFAULT())
else:
if user.role != 'admin' and not await channel_has_access(user.id, channel, permission='read', db=db):
# Pin/unpin mutates is_pinned/pinned_by/pinned_at — require write.
if user.role != 'admin' and not await channel_has_access(user.id, channel, permission='write', db=db):
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.DEFAULT())
message = await Messages.get_message_by_id(message_id, db=db)
@@ -1368,6 +1359,9 @@ async def update_message_by_id(
if channel.type in ['group', 'dm']:
if not await Channels.is_user_channel_member(channel.id, user.id, db=db):
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.DEFAULT())
# Membership is not authorship — block cross-member edits.
if user.role != 'admin' and message.user_id != user.id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.DEFAULT())
else:
if (
user.role != 'admin'
@@ -1569,6 +1563,9 @@ async def delete_message_by_id(
if channel.type in ['group', 'dm']:
if not await Channels.is_user_channel_member(channel.id, user.id, db=db):
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.DEFAULT())
# Membership is not authorship — block cross-member deletes.
if user.role != 'admin' and message.user_id != user.id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.DEFAULT())
else:
if (
user.role != 'admin'
+11 -17
View File
@@ -877,7 +877,7 @@ async def get_shared_chat_by_id(
# Look up the original chat_id to check access grants (admins bypass)
if user.role != 'admin' or not ENABLE_ADMIN_CHAT_ACCESS:
shared = await SharedChats.get_by_id(share_id, db=db)
if shared:
if shared and shared.user_id != user.id:
has_grant = await AccessGrants.has_access(
user_id=user.id,
resource_type='shared_chat',
@@ -1241,9 +1241,9 @@ async def clone_shared_chat_by_id(
detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.NOT_FOUND,
)
# Enforce access grants
# Enforce access grants (owner and admins bypass)
shared = await SharedChats.get_by_id(id, db=db)
if shared and user.role != 'admin':
if shared and user.role != 'admin' and shared.user_id != user.id:
has_grant = await AccessGrants.has_access(
user_id=user.id,
resource_type='shared_chat',
@@ -1412,19 +1412,16 @@ async def update_shared_chat_access_by_id(
user=Depends(get_verified_user),
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_async_session),
):
chat = await Chats.get_chat_by_id_and_user_id(id, user.id, db=db)
if user.role == 'admin':
chat = await Chats.get_chat_by_id(id, db=db)
else:
chat = await Chats.get_chat_by_id_and_user_id(id, user.id, db=db)
if not chat:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND,
detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.NOT_FOUND,
)
if chat.user_id != user.id and user.role != 'admin':
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.ACCESS_PROHIBITED,
)
form_data.access_grants = await filter_allowed_access_grants(
request.app.state.config.USER_PERMISSIONS,
user.id,
@@ -1449,19 +1446,16 @@ async def get_shared_chat_access_by_id(
user=Depends(get_verified_user),
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_async_session),
):
chat = await Chats.get_chat_by_id_and_user_id(id, user.id, db=db)
if user.role == 'admin':
chat = await Chats.get_chat_by_id(id, db=db)
else:
chat = await Chats.get_chat_by_id_and_user_id(id, user.id, db=db)
if not chat:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND,
detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.NOT_FOUND,
)
if chat.user_id != user.id and user.role != 'admin':
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.ACCESS_PROHIBITED,
)
grants = await AccessGrants.get_grants_by_resource('shared_chat', id, db=db)
return [
{
+15 -16
View File
@@ -16,8 +16,6 @@ from open_webui.models.folders import (
Folders,
)
from open_webui.models.chats import Chats
from open_webui.models.files import Files
from open_webui.models.knowledge import Knowledges
from open_webui.config import UPLOAD_DIR
@@ -32,6 +30,7 @@ from fastapi.responses import FileResponse, StreamingResponse
from open_webui.utils.auth import get_admin_user, get_verified_user
from open_webui.utils.access_control import has_permission
from open_webui.utils.access_control.files import get_accessible_folder_files
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -75,20 +74,10 @@ async def get_folders(
if folder.parent_id and not await Folders.get_folder_by_id_and_user_id(folder.parent_id, user.id, db=db):
folder = await Folders.update_folder_parent_id_by_id_and_user_id(folder.id, user.id, None, db=db)
if folder.data:
if 'files' in folder.data:
valid_files = []
for file in folder.data['files']:
if file.get('type') == 'file':
if await Files.check_access_by_user_id(file.get('id'), user.id, 'read', db=db):
valid_files.append(file)
elif file.get('type') == 'collection':
if await Knowledges.check_access_by_user_id(file.get('id'), user.id, 'read', db=db):
valid_files.append(file)
else:
valid_files.append(file)
folder.data['files'] = valid_files
if folder.data and 'files' in folder.data:
accessible_files = await get_accessible_folder_files(folder.data['files'], user, db=db)
if len(accessible_files) != len(folder.data.get('files', [])):
folder.data['files'] = accessible_files
await Folders.update_folder_by_id_and_user_id(
folder.id, user.id, FolderUpdateForm(data=folder.data), db=db
)
@@ -173,6 +162,16 @@ async def update_folder_name_by_id(
detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.DEFAULT('Folder already exists'),
)
# Validate read access to every file/collection being attached.
# Folder files are consumed by chat middleware as RAG context.
if form_data.data and isinstance(form_data.data.get('files'), list):
accessible_files = await get_accessible_folder_files(form_data.data['files'], user, db=db)
if len(accessible_files) != len(form_data.data['files']):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.ACCESS_PROHIBITED,
)
try:
folder = await Folders.update_folder_by_id_and_user_id(id, user.id, form_data, db=db)
return folder
+11 -3
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ from open_webui.config import (
)
from open_webui.constants import ERROR_MESSAGES
from open_webui.retrieval.web.utils import validate_url
from open_webui.env import AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL, ENABLE_FORWARD_USER_INFO_HEADERS
from open_webui.env import AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL, AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS, ENABLE_FORWARD_USER_INFO_HEADERS
from open_webui.utils.session_pool import get_session
from open_webui.models.chats import Chats
@@ -442,6 +442,8 @@ GenerateImageForm = CreateImageForm # Alias for backward compatibility
async def get_image_data(data: str, headers=None):
try:
if data.startswith('http://') or data.startswith('https://'):
# Defense-in-depth: gate before fetch (mirrors load_url_image).
validate_url(data)
session = await get_session()
async with session.get(
data,
@@ -807,10 +809,16 @@ async def image_edits(
return data
if data.startswith('http://') or data.startswith('https://'):
# Validate URL to prevent SSRF attacks against local/private networks
# Validate URL to prevent SSRF attacks against local/private networks.
# allow_redirects=False prevents redirect-based SSRF: validate_url() is
# called only on the originally-submitted URL; following 3xx redirects
# without re-validation would let an attacker reach private IPs via a
# public host that redirects internally (e.g. cloud-metadata exfil).
validate_url(data)
session = await get_session()
async with session.get(data, ssl=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL) as r:
async with session.get(
data, ssl=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL, allow_redirects=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS
) as r:
r.raise_for_status()
image_data = base64.b64encode(await r.read()).decode('utf-8')
+18
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ from open_webui.storage.provider import Storage
from open_webui.constants import ERROR_MESSAGES
from open_webui.utils.auth import get_verified_user, get_admin_user
from open_webui.utils.access_control import has_permission, filter_allowed_access_grants
from open_webui.utils.access_control.files import has_access_to_file
from open_webui.models.access_grants import AccessGrants
@@ -656,6 +657,14 @@ async def add_file_to_knowledge_by_id(
detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.FILE_NOT_PROCESSED,
)
# KB write-access alone is not enough — caller must also be able to read the file.
if file.user_id != user.id and user.role != 'admin':
if not await has_access_to_file(file.id, 'read', user, db=db):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.ACCESS_PROHIBITED,
)
# Add content to the vector database
try:
await process_file(
@@ -1017,6 +1026,15 @@ async def add_files_to_knowledge_batch(
detail=f'File {missing_ids[0]} not found',
)
# Per-file read-access check — same gate as the single-file endpoint.
if user.role != 'admin':
for file in files:
if file.user_id != user.id and not await has_access_to_file(file.id, 'read', user, db=db):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.ACCESS_PROHIBITED,
)
# Process files
try:
result = await process_files_batch(
+22 -15
View File
@@ -413,30 +413,37 @@ class ModelIdForm(BaseModel):
async def get_model_by_id(id: str, user=Depends(get_verified_user), db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_async_session)):
model = await Models.get_model_by_id(id, db=db)
if model:
if (
write_access = (
(user.role == 'admin' and BYPASS_ADMIN_ACCESS_CONTROL)
or model.user_id == user.id
or user.id == model.user_id
or await AccessGrants.has_access(
user_id=user.id,
resource_type='model',
resource_id=model.id,
permission='read',
permission='write',
db=db,
)
)
if write_access or await AccessGrants.has_access(
user_id=user.id,
resource_type='model',
resource_id=model.id,
permission='read',
db=db,
):
model_dict = model.model_dump()
# Strip params (system prompt and other admin-curated config)
# for read-only callers — matches the params strip already
# enforced on /api/models in utils/models.py. Owners, admins
# under BYPASS_ADMIN_ACCESS_CONTROL, and write-grant holders
# still receive the full object so the workspace edit UI keeps
# working for users who legitimately curate the model.
if not write_access:
model_dict['params'] = {}
return ModelAccessResponse(
**model.model_dump(),
write_access=(
(user.role == 'admin' and BYPASS_ADMIN_ACCESS_CONTROL)
or user.id == model.user_id
or await AccessGrants.has_access(
user_id=user.id,
resource_type='model',
resource_id=model.id,
permission='write',
db=db,
)
),
**model_dict,
write_access=write_access,
)
else:
raise HTTPException(
+4 -1
View File
@@ -294,7 +294,10 @@ async def get_note_by_id(
)
pinned_note_ids = await Notes.get_pinned_note_ids(user.id, db=db)
return NoteResponse(**note.model_dump(), write_access=write_access, is_pinned=note.id in pinned_note_ids)
return NoteResponse(
**{**note.model_dump(), 'is_pinned': note.id in pinned_note_ids},
write_access=write_access,
)
############################
+5 -16
View File
@@ -260,22 +260,6 @@ class SearchForm(BaseModel):
queries: List[str]
@router.get('/')
async def get_status(request: Request):
return {
'status': True,
'CHUNK_SIZE': request.app.state.config.CHUNK_SIZE,
'CHUNK_OVERLAP': request.app.state.config.CHUNK_OVERLAP,
'RAG_TEMPLATE': request.app.state.config.RAG_TEMPLATE,
'RAG_EMBEDDING_ENGINE': request.app.state.config.RAG_EMBEDDING_ENGINE,
'RAG_EMBEDDING_MODEL': request.app.state.config.RAG_EMBEDDING_MODEL,
'RAG_RERANKING_MODEL': request.app.state.config.RAG_RERANKING_MODEL,
'RAG_EMBEDDING_BATCH_SIZE': request.app.state.config.RAG_EMBEDDING_BATCH_SIZE,
'ENABLE_ASYNC_EMBEDDING': request.app.state.config.ENABLE_ASYNC_EMBEDDING,
'RAG_EMBEDDING_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS': request.app.state.config.RAG_EMBEDDING_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS,
}
@router.get('/embedding')
async def get_embedding_config(request: Request, user=Depends(get_admin_user)):
return {
@@ -1583,6 +1567,8 @@ async def process_file(
if collection_name is None:
collection_name = f'file-{file.id}'
else:
await _validate_collection_access([collection_name], user, access_type='write')
if form_data.content:
# Update the content in the file
@@ -2633,6 +2619,9 @@ async def process_files_batch(
collection_name = form_data.collection_name
if collection_name:
await _validate_collection_access([collection_name], user, access_type='write')
file_results: List[BatchProcessFilesResult] = []
file_errors: List[BatchProcessFilesResult] = []
file_updates: List[FileUpdateForm] = []
+26
View File
@@ -176,6 +176,19 @@ async def create_new_skill(
detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.ID_TAKEN,
)
# Strip public/user grants the requesting user is not permitted to assign
# (matches the channel/notes/calendar pattern). Without this, a user with
# workspace.skills permission could attach principal_id='*' read/write
# grants in the create payload, bypassing the sharing.public_skills gate
# that the dedicated /access/update endpoint already enforces.
form_data.access_grants = await filter_allowed_access_grants(
request.app.state.config.USER_PERMISSIONS,
user.id,
user.role,
form_data.access_grants,
'sharing.public_skills',
)
try:
skill = await Skills.insert_new_skill(user.id, form_data, db=db)
if skill:
@@ -276,6 +289,19 @@ async def update_skill_by_id(
detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.UNAUTHORIZED,
)
# Strip public/user grants the requesting user is not permitted to assign
# (matches the channel/notes/calendar pattern). The access check above only
# restricts WHO can write to the skill; this filter restricts WHICH grants
# they may set, so a non-admin owner cannot make their own skill publicly
# readable/writable without sharing.public_skills permission.
form_data.access_grants = await filter_allowed_access_grants(
request.app.state.config.USER_PERMISSIONS,
user.id,
user.role,
form_data.access_grants,
'sharing.public_skills',
)
try:
updated = {
**form_data.model_dump(exclude={'id'}),
+3
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ from starlette.background import BackgroundTask
from open_webui.utils.auth import get_verified_user
from open_webui.utils.access_control import has_connection_access
from open_webui.env import AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL
from open_webui.config import TERMINAL_PROXY_HEADERS
from open_webui.models.groups import Groups
from open_webui.models.users import Users
@@ -151,6 +152,8 @@ async def proxy_terminal(
for key, value in upstream_response.headers.items()
if key.lower() not in STRIPPED_RESPONSE_HEADERS
}
if TERMINAL_PROXY_HEADERS:
filtered_headers.update(TERMINAL_PROXY_HEADERS)
# Stream binary responses directly
if any(t in upstream_content_type for t in STREAMING_CONTENT_TYPES):
+11
View File
@@ -480,6 +480,17 @@ async def update_tools_by_id(
detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.UNAUTHORIZED,
)
# Content edits trigger exec on load — gate them behind workspace.tools (matches /create).
if form_data.content != tools.content:
if user.role != 'admin' and not (
await has_permission(user.id, 'workspace.tools', request.app.state.config.USER_PERMISSIONS, db=db)
or await has_permission(user.id, 'workspace.tools_import', request.app.state.config.USER_PERMISSIONS, db=db)
):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.UNAUTHORIZED,
)
try:
form_data.content = replace_imports(form_data.content)
tool_module, frontmatter = await load_tool_module_by_id(id, content=form_data.content)
+11 -3
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ from open_webui.models.users import (
)
from open_webui.constants import ERROR_MESSAGES
from open_webui.env import ENABLE_PROFILE_IMAGE_URL_FORWARDING, STATIC_DIR
from open_webui.env import ENABLE_PROFILE_IMAGE_URL_FORWARDING, PROFILE_IMAGE_ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES, STATIC_DIR
from open_webui.internal.db import get_async_session
@@ -194,6 +194,7 @@ class SharingPermissions(BaseModel):
notes: bool = False
public_notes: bool = True
public_chats: bool = False
public_calendars: bool = False
class AccessGrantsPermissions(BaseModel):
@@ -235,6 +236,7 @@ class FeaturesPermissions(BaseModel):
code_interpreter: bool = True
memories: bool = True
automations: bool = False
calendar: bool = True
class SettingsPermissions(BaseModel):
@@ -492,12 +494,18 @@ async def get_user_profile_image_by_id(user_id: str, user=Depends(get_verified_u
header, base64_data = user.profile_image_url.split(',', 1)
image_data = base64.b64decode(base64_data)
image_buffer = io.BytesIO(image_data)
media_type = header.split(';')[0].lstrip('data:')
media_type = header.split(';')[0].lstrip('data:').lower()
if media_type not in PROFILE_IMAGE_ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES:
return FileResponse(f'{STATIC_DIR}/user.png')
return StreamingResponse(
image_buffer,
media_type=media_type,
headers={'Content-Disposition': 'inline'},
headers={
'Content-Disposition': 'inline',
'X-Content-Type-Options': 'nosniff',
},
)
except Exception as e:
pass
+69
View File
@@ -832,7 +832,76 @@ async def disconnect(sid):
# print(f"Unknown session ID {sid} disconnected")
async def _make_channel_emitter(request_info):
"""Event emitter that routes pipeline output to a channel message.
Translates chat:completion events into channel message:update socket
emissions, throttled to avoid flooding with per-token updates.
"""
channel_id = request_info['chat_id'].removeprefix('channel:')
message_id = request_info['message_id']
state = {'last_emit_at': 0.0}
THROTTLE_INTERVAL = 0.15 # ~6 updates/sec
async def _emit_channel_update(content: str, done: bool = False):
from open_webui.models.messages import Messages, MessageForm
update_form = MessageForm(content=content)
if done:
# Merge done flag into existing meta (preserve model_id etc.)
msg = await Messages.get_message_by_id(message_id)
existing_meta = (msg.meta or {}) if msg else {}
update_form = MessageForm(
content=content,
meta={**existing_meta, 'done': True},
)
await Messages.update_message_by_id(message_id, update_form)
message = await Messages.get_message_by_id(message_id)
if message:
await sio.emit(
'events:channel',
{
'channel_id': channel_id,
'message_id': message_id,
'data': {
'type': 'message:update',
'data': message.model_dump(),
},
},
to=f'channel:{channel_id}',
)
async def __channel_emitter__(event_data):
event_type = event_data.get('type')
if event_type == 'chat:completion':
data = event_data.get('data', {})
content = data.get('content', '')
done = data.get('done', False)
if not content and not done:
return
now = __import__('time').time()
if done or (now - state['last_emit_at']) >= THROTTLE_INTERVAL:
state['last_emit_at'] = now
await _emit_channel_update(content, done)
elif event_type == 'chat:message:error':
error = event_data.get('data', {}).get('error', {})
error_content = error.get('content', 'An error occurred') if isinstance(error, dict) else str(error)
await _emit_channel_update(f'Error: {error_content}', done=True)
return __channel_emitter__
async def get_event_emitter(request_info, update_db=True):
# Channel mode: route pipeline output to channel message updates
if request_info.get('chat_id', '').startswith('channel:'):
return await _make_channel_emitter(request_info)
async def __event_emitter__(event_data):
user_id = request_info['user_id']
chat_id = request_info['chat_id']
@@ -87,3 +87,38 @@ async def has_access_to_file(
return True
return False
async def get_accessible_folder_files(
entries: list[dict] | None,
user: UserModel,
db: AsyncSession | None = None,
) -> list[dict]:
"""Filter folder.data['files'] entries to those the caller can read.
Each entry is expected to have 'type' ('file' or 'collection') and 'id'.
Admins bypass all checks. Unknown types are kept as-is.
"""
if not entries:
return []
if user.role == 'admin':
return list(entries)
accessible: list[dict] = []
for entry in entries:
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
continue
entry_type = entry.get('type')
entry_id = entry.get('id')
if not entry_id:
accessible.append(entry)
continue
if entry_type == 'file':
if await has_access_to_file(entry_id, 'read', user, db=db):
accessible.append(entry)
elif entry_type == 'collection':
if await Knowledges.check_access_by_user_id(entry_id, user.id, 'read', db=db):
accessible.append(entry)
else:
accessible.append(entry)
return accessible
+3 -1
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ import aiohttp
import websockets
from pydantic import BaseModel
from open_webui.env import AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -88,7 +90,7 @@ class JupyterCodeExecuter:
async with self.session.post(
'login',
data={'_xsrf': xsrf_token, 'password': self.password},
allow_redirects=False,
allow_redirects=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS,
) as response:
response.raise_for_status()
self.session.cookie_jar.update_cookies(response.cookies)
+13 -3
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,11 @@ import base64
import io
import re
from open_webui.env import AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL, ENABLE_IMAGE_CONTENT_TYPE_EXTENSION_FALLBACK
from open_webui.env import (
AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS,
AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL,
ENABLE_IMAGE_CONTENT_TYPE_EXTENSION_FALLBACK,
)
from open_webui.utils.session_pool import get_session
BASE64_IMAGE_URL_PREFIX = re.compile(r'data:image/\w+;base64,', re.IGNORECASE)
@@ -53,11 +57,17 @@ _IMAGE_MIME_FALLBACK = {
async def get_image_base64_from_url(url: str) -> Optional[str]:
try:
if url.startswith('http'):
# Validate URL to prevent SSRF attacks against local/private networks
# Validate URL to prevent SSRF attacks against local/private networks.
# allow_redirects=False prevents redirect-based SSRF: validate_url() is
# called only on the originally-submitted URL; following 3xx redirects
# without re-validation would let an attacker reach private IPs via a
# public host that redirects internally (e.g. cloud-metadata exfil).
validate_url(url)
# Download the image from the URL
session = await get_session()
async with session.get(url, ssl=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL) as response:
async with session.get(
url, ssl=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL, allow_redirects=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS
) as response:
response.raise_for_status()
image_data = await response.read()
encoded_string = base64.b64encode(image_data).decode('utf-8')
+95 -72
View File
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ from open_webui.utils.tools import (
get_terminal_tools,
)
from open_webui.utils.access_control import has_connection_access
from open_webui.utils.access_control.files import get_accessible_folder_files
from open_webui.utils.plugin import load_function_module_by_id
from open_webui.utils.filter import (
get_sorted_filter_ids,
@@ -1707,7 +1708,7 @@ async def add_file_context(messages: list, chat_id: str, user) -> list:
"""
Add file URLs to messages for native function calling.
"""
if not chat_id or chat_id.startswith('local:'):
if not chat_id or chat_id.startswith('local:') or chat_id.startswith('channel:'):
return messages
chat = await Chats.get_chat_by_id_and_user_id(chat_id, user.id)
@@ -1763,7 +1764,7 @@ async def chat_image_generation_handler(request: Request, form_data: dict, extra
if not chat_id or not isinstance(chat_id, str) or not __event_emitter__:
return form_data
if chat_id.startswith('local:'):
if chat_id.startswith('local:') or chat_id.startswith('channel:'):
message_list = form_data.get('messages', [])
else:
chat = await Chats.get_chat_by_id_and_user_id(chat_id, user.id)
@@ -2295,7 +2296,7 @@ async def process_chat_payload(request, form_data, user, metadata, model):
chat_id = metadata.get('chat_id')
user_message_id = metadata.get('user_message_id')
if chat_id and user_message_id and not chat_id.startswith('local:'):
if chat_id and user_message_id and not chat_id.startswith('local:') and not chat_id.startswith('channel:'):
db_messages = await load_messages_from_db(chat_id, user_message_id)
if db_messages:
# Continue: frontend sends assistant_message_id when continuing
@@ -2407,15 +2408,17 @@ async def process_chat_payload(request, form_data, user, metadata, model):
if 'system_prompt' in folder.data:
form_data = await apply_system_prompt_to_body(folder.data['system_prompt'], form_data, metadata, user)
if 'files' in folder.data:
# Defensive: filter to entries the caller can still read.
allowed_files = await get_accessible_folder_files(folder.data['files'], user)
if metadata.get('params', {}).get('function_calling') != 'native':
form_data['files'] = [
*folder.data['files'],
*allowed_files,
*form_data.get('files', []),
]
else:
# Native FC: skip RAG injection, builtin tools
# will read folder knowledge from metadata.
metadata['folder_knowledge'] = folder.data['files']
metadata['folder_knowledge'] = allowed_files
# Model "Knowledge" handling
user_message = get_last_user_message(form_data['messages'])
@@ -2615,7 +2618,7 @@ async def process_chat_payload(request, form_data, user, metadata, model):
folder = await Folders.get_folder_by_id_and_user_id(folder_id, user.id)
if folder and folder.data and 'files' in folder.data:
files = [f for f in files if f.get('id', None) != folder_id]
files = [*files, *folder.data['files']]
files = [*files, *await get_accessible_folder_files(folder.data['files'], user)]
# files = [*files, *[{"type": "url", "url": url, "name": url} for url in urls]]
# Remove duplicate files based on their content
@@ -3055,7 +3058,11 @@ async def background_tasks_handler(ctx):
message = None
messages = []
if 'chat_id' in metadata and not metadata['chat_id'].startswith('local:'):
if (
'chat_id' in metadata
and not metadata['chat_id'].startswith('local:')
and not metadata['chat_id'].startswith('channel:')
):
messages_map = await Chats.get_messages_map_by_chat_id(metadata['chat_id'])
message = messages_map.get(metadata['message_id']) if messages_map else None
@@ -3135,7 +3142,9 @@ async def background_tasks_handler(ctx):
}
)
if not metadata.get('chat_id', '').startswith('local:'):
if not metadata.get('chat_id', '').startswith('local:') and not metadata.get(
'chat_id', ''
).startswith('channel:'):
await Chats.upsert_message_to_chat_by_id_and_message_id(
metadata['chat_id'],
metadata['message_id'],
@@ -3147,7 +3156,9 @@ async def background_tasks_handler(ctx):
except Exception as e:
pass
if not metadata.get('chat_id', '').startswith('local:'): # Only update titles and tags for non-temp chats
if not metadata.get('chat_id', '').startswith('local:') and not metadata.get('chat_id', '').startswith(
'channel:'
): # Only update titles and tags for non-temp chats
if TASKS.TITLE_GENERATION in tasks:
user_message = get_last_user_message(messages)
if user_message and len(user_message) > 100:
@@ -3271,7 +3282,7 @@ async def outlet_filter_handler(ctx):
if not chat_id or not message_id:
return
is_temp_chat = chat_id.startswith('local:')
is_temp_chat = chat_id.startswith('local:') or chat_id.startswith('channel:')
try:
messages_map = None
@@ -3413,13 +3424,14 @@ async def non_streaming_chat_response_handler(response, ctx):
log.error('Provider returned error (non-streaming): %s', error)
await Chats.upsert_message_to_chat_by_id_and_message_id(
metadata['chat_id'],
metadata['message_id'],
{
'error': {'content': error},
},
)
if not metadata['chat_id'].startswith('channel:'):
await Chats.upsert_message_to_chat_by_id_and_message_id(
metadata['chat_id'],
metadata['message_id'],
{
'error': {'content': error},
},
)
if isinstance(error, str) or isinstance(error, dict):
await event_emitter(
{
@@ -3428,7 +3440,7 @@ async def non_streaming_chat_response_handler(response, ctx):
}
)
if 'selected_model_id' in response_data:
if 'selected_model_id' in response_data and not metadata['chat_id'].startswith('channel:'):
await Chats.upsert_message_to_chat_by_id_and_message_id(
metadata['chat_id'],
metadata['message_id'],
@@ -3449,7 +3461,11 @@ async def non_streaming_chat_response_handler(response, ctx):
}
)
title = await Chats.get_chat_title_by_id(metadata['chat_id'])
title = (
await Chats.get_chat_title_by_id(metadata['chat_id'])
if not metadata['chat_id'].startswith('channel:')
else ''
)
# Use output from backend if provided (OR-compliant backends),
# otherwise generate from response content
@@ -3480,17 +3496,18 @@ async def non_streaming_chat_response_handler(response, ctx):
# Save message in the database
usage = normalize_usage(response_data.get('usage', {}) or {})
await Chats.upsert_message_to_chat_by_id_and_message_id(
metadata['chat_id'],
metadata['message_id'],
{
'done': True,
'role': 'assistant',
'content': content,
'output': response_output,
**({'usage': usage} if usage else {}),
},
)
if not metadata['chat_id'].startswith('channel:'):
await Chats.upsert_message_to_chat_by_id_and_message_id(
metadata['chat_id'],
metadata['message_id'],
{
'done': True,
'role': 'assistant',
'content': content,
'output': response_output,
**({'usage': usage} if usage else {}),
},
)
# Send a webhook notification if the user is not active
if request.app.state.config.ENABLE_USER_WEBHOOKS and not await Users.is_user_active(user.id):
@@ -4345,7 +4362,7 @@ async def streaming_chat_response_handler(response, ctx):
if end:
break
if ENABLE_REALTIME_CHAT_SAVE:
if ENABLE_REALTIME_CHAT_SAVE and not metadata['chat_id'].startswith('channel:'):
# Save message in the database
await Chats.upsert_message_to_chat_by_id_and_message_id(
metadata['chat_id'],
@@ -5021,7 +5038,11 @@ async def streaming_chat_response_handler(response, ctx):
if item.get('status') == 'in_progress':
item['status'] = 'completed'
title = await Chats.get_chat_title_by_id(metadata['chat_id'])
title = (
await Chats.get_chat_title_by_id(metadata['chat_id'])
if not metadata['chat_id'].startswith('channel:')
else ''
)
data = {
'done': True,
'content': serialize_output(output),
@@ -5030,30 +5051,31 @@ async def streaming_chat_response_handler(response, ctx):
**({'usage': usage} if usage else {}),
}
if not ENABLE_REALTIME_CHAT_SAVE:
# Save message in the database
await Chats.upsert_message_to_chat_by_id_and_message_id(
metadata['chat_id'],
metadata['message_id'],
{
'done': True,
'content': serialize_output(output),
'output': output,
**({'usage': usage} if usage else {}),
},
)
elif usage:
await Chats.upsert_message_to_chat_by_id_and_message_id(
metadata['chat_id'],
metadata['message_id'],
{'done': True, 'usage': usage},
)
else:
await Chats.upsert_message_to_chat_by_id_and_message_id(
metadata['chat_id'],
metadata['message_id'],
{'done': True},
)
if not metadata['chat_id'].startswith('channel:'):
if not ENABLE_REALTIME_CHAT_SAVE:
# Save message in the database
await Chats.upsert_message_to_chat_by_id_and_message_id(
metadata['chat_id'],
metadata['message_id'],
{
'done': True,
'content': serialize_output(output),
'output': output,
**({'usage': usage} if usage else {}),
},
)
elif usage:
await Chats.upsert_message_to_chat_by_id_and_message_id(
metadata['chat_id'],
metadata['message_id'],
{'done': True, 'usage': usage},
)
else:
await Chats.upsert_message_to_chat_by_id_and_message_id(
metadata['chat_id'],
metadata['message_id'],
{'done': True},
)
# Send a webhook notification if the user is not active
if request.app.state.config.ENABLE_USER_WEBHOOKS and not await Users.is_user_active(user.id):
@@ -5100,22 +5122,23 @@ async def streaming_chat_response_handler(response, ctx):
async def save_cancelled_state():
await event_emitter({'type': 'chat:tasks:cancel'})
if not ENABLE_REALTIME_CHAT_SAVE:
await Chats.upsert_message_to_chat_by_id_and_message_id(
metadata['chat_id'],
metadata['message_id'],
{
'done': True,
'content': serialize_output(output),
'output': output,
},
)
else:
await Chats.upsert_message_to_chat_by_id_and_message_id(
metadata['chat_id'],
metadata['message_id'],
{'done': True},
)
if not metadata['chat_id'].startswith('channel:'):
if not ENABLE_REALTIME_CHAT_SAVE:
await Chats.upsert_message_to_chat_by_id_and_message_id(
metadata['chat_id'],
metadata['message_id'],
{
'done': True,
'content': serialize_output(output),
'output': output,
},
)
else:
await Chats.upsert_message_to_chat_by_id_and_message_id(
metadata['chat_id'],
metadata['message_id'],
{'done': True},
)
try:
await asyncio.shield(save_cancelled_state())
+2 -1
View File
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ from open_webui.config import (
from open_webui.constants import ERROR_MESSAGES, WEBHOOK_MESSAGES
from open_webui.env import (
AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL,
AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS,
WEBUI_NAME,
WEBUI_AUTH_COOKIE_SAME_SITE,
WEBUI_AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE,
@@ -740,7 +741,7 @@ class OAuthClientManager:
async with aiohttp.ClientSession(trust_env=True) as session:
async with session.get(
authorization_url,
allow_redirects=False,
allow_redirects=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS,
ssl=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL,
) as resp:
if resp.status < 400:
+3 -2
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ from open_webui.utils.access_control import has_access, has_connection_access
from open_webui.config import BYPASS_ADMIN_ACCESS_CONTROL
from open_webui.env import (
AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL,
AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS,
AIOHTTP_CLIENT_TIMEOUT,
AIOHTTP_CLIENT_TIMEOUT_TOOL_SERVER,
AIOHTTP_CLIENT_TIMEOUT_TOOL_SERVER_DATA,
@@ -1433,7 +1434,7 @@ async def execute_tool_server(
headers=headers,
cookies=cookies,
ssl=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_TOOL_SERVER_SSL,
allow_redirects=False,
allow_redirects=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS,
) as response:
if response.status >= 400:
text = await response.text()
@@ -1458,7 +1459,7 @@ async def execute_tool_server(
headers=headers,
cookies=cookies,
ssl=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_TOOL_SERVER_SSL,
allow_redirects=False,
allow_redirects=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS,
) as response:
if response.status >= 400:
text = await response.text()
+5 -9
View File
@@ -3,17 +3,13 @@
import re
from urllib.parse import urlparse
# Matches the OWUI-generated profile image route. ``[^/?#]+`` accepts
# any user-ID without allowing path-traversal or query/fragment injection,
# and the ``$`` anchor rejects trailing path components.
from open_webui.env import PROFILE_IMAGE_ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES
_USER_PROFILE_IMAGE_RE = re.compile(r'^/api/v1/users/[^/?#]+/profile/image$')
# Validates MIME type and structure of base64 data URIs. Only the prefix
# is checked — validating the full base64 payload would mean running a
# regex across megabytes of data on every Pydantic instantiation for zero
# security benefit (corrupt base64 simply renders a broken image, same as
# a 404 URL). SVG is intentionally excluded: it can carry embedded scripts.
_SAFE_DATA_URI_RE = re.compile(r'^data:image/(png|jpeg|gif|webp);base64,', re.IGNORECASE)
# Data-URI prefix validator derived from PROFILE_IMAGE_ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES.
_mime_suffixes = '|'.join(re.escape(t.split('/')[-1]) for t in sorted(PROFILE_IMAGE_ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES))
_SAFE_DATA_URI_RE = re.compile(rf'^data:image/({_mime_suffixes});base64,', re.IGNORECASE)
# Exact relative paths accepted as profile images. These are the only
# static-asset paths OWUI itself assigns; no prefix/wildcard matching is
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
{
"name": "open-webui",
"version": "0.9.4",
"version": "0.9.5",
"lockfileVersion": 3,
"requires": true,
"packages": {
"": {
"name": "open-webui",
"version": "0.9.4",
"version": "0.9.5",
"dependencies": {
"@azure/msal-browser": "^4.5.0",
"@codemirror/lang-javascript": "^6.2.2",
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "open-webui",
"version": "0.9.4",
"version": "0.9.5",
"private": true,
"scripts": {
"dev": "npm run pyodide:fetch && vite dev --host",
@@ -410,6 +410,24 @@
{/if}
</div>
{/if}
{#if permissions.features.calendar}
<div class="flex flex-col w-full">
<div class="flex w-full justify-between my-1">
<div class=" self-center text-xs font-medium">
{$i18n.t('Calendars Public Sharing')}
</div>
<Switch bind:state={permissions.sharing.public_calendars} />
</div>
{#if defaultPermissions?.sharing?.public_calendars && !permissions.sharing.public_calendars}
<div>
<div class="text-xs text-gray-500">
{$i18n.t('This is a default user permission and will remain enabled.')}
</div>
</div>
{/if}
</div>
{/if}
</div>
<hr class=" border-gray-100/30 dark:border-gray-850/30" />
+6 -1
View File
@@ -7,12 +7,14 @@
import {
artifactCode,
chatId,
config,
settings,
showArtifacts,
showControls,
artifactContents
} from '$lib/stores';
import { copyToClipboard, createMessagesList } from '$lib/utils';
import { injectCsp } from '$lib/utils/csp';
import XMark from '../icons/XMark.svelte';
import ArrowsPointingOut from '../icons/ArrowsPointingOut.svelte';
@@ -242,7 +244,10 @@
<iframe
bind:this={iframeElement}
title="Content"
srcdoc={contents[selectedContentIdx].content}
srcdoc={injectCsp(
contents[selectedContentIdx].content,
$config?.ui?.iframe_csp ?? ''
)}
class="w-full border-0 h-full rounded-none"
sandbox="allow-scripts allow-downloads{($settings?.iframeSandboxAllowForms ?? false)
? ' allow-forms'
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
import { getContext, tick } from 'svelte';
import { marked } from 'marked';
import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';
import { settings } from '$lib/stores';
import { settings, config } from '$lib/stores';
import { injectCsp } from '$lib/utils/csp';
import { isCodeFile } from '$lib/utils/codeHighlight';
import { initMermaid, renderMermaidDiagram } from '$lib/utils';
import Spinner from '../../common/Spinner.svelte';
@@ -411,7 +412,7 @@
<div class="absolute top-0 left-0 right-0 bottom-0 z-10"></div>
{/if}
<iframe
srcdoc={fileContent}
srcdoc={injectCsp(fileContent, $config?.ui?.iframe_csp ?? '')}
sandbox="allow-scripts allow-downloads{($settings?.iframeSandboxAllowForms ?? false)
? ' allow-forms'
: ''}{($settings?.iframeSandboxAllowSameOrigin ?? false) ? ' allow-same-origin' : ''}"
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
import Tooltip from '$lib/components/common/Tooltip.svelte';
import Markdown from '$lib/components/chat/Messages/Markdown.svelte';
import { WEBUI_API_BASE_URL } from '$lib/constants';
import { settings } from '$lib/stores';
import { settings, config } from '$lib/stores';
import { injectCsp } from '$lib/utils/csp';
import XMark from '$lib/components/icons/XMark.svelte';
import Textarea from '$lib/components/common/Textarea.svelte';
@@ -218,7 +219,7 @@
false)
? ' allow-same-origin'
: ''}"
srcdoc={document.document}
srcdoc={injectCsp(document.document, $config?.ui?.iframe_csp ?? '')}
title={$i18n.t('Content')}
></iframe>
{:else}
@@ -15,6 +15,57 @@
import FloatingButtons from '../ContentRenderer/FloatingButtons.svelte';
import { createMessagesList } from '$lib/utils';
/**
* Extracts all top-level <details>...</details> blocks from content,
* handling nested <details> via depth tracking.
* Returns { detailsContent, plainContent }.
*/
const extractDetailsBlocks = (text) => {
const blocks = [];
let remaining = text;
let result = '';
const openTag = '<details';
const closeTag = '</details>';
while (true) {
const start = remaining.indexOf(openTag);
if (start === -1) {
result += remaining;
break;
}
result += remaining.slice(0, start);
// Find matching closing tag with depth tracking
let depth = 1;
let idx = start + openTag.length;
while (depth > 0 && idx < remaining.length) {
if (remaining.startsWith(openTag, idx)) {
depth++;
} else if (remaining.startsWith(closeTag, idx)) {
depth--;
}
if (depth > 0) idx++;
}
if (depth === 0) {
const end = idx + closeTag.length;
blocks.push(remaining.slice(start, end));
remaining = remaining.slice(end);
} else {
// Unmatched opening tag, treat as plain text
result += remaining.slice(start);
remaining = '';
break;
}
}
return {
detailsContent: blocks.join('\n'),
plainContent: result.trim()
};
};
export let id;
export let content;
@@ -174,43 +225,55 @@
</script>
<div bind:this={contentContainerElement}>
<Markdown
{id}
content={model?.info?.meta?.capabilities?.citations == false
? content.replace(/\s*(\[(?:\d+(?:#[^,\]\s]+)?(?:,\s*\d+(?:#[^,\]\s]+)?)*)\])+/g, '')
: content}
{model}
{save}
{preview}
{done}
{editCodeBlock}
{topPadding}
{sourceIds}
{onSourceClick}
{onTaskClick}
{onSave}
onUpdate={async (token) => {
const { lang, text: code } = token;
{#if $settings?.renderMarkdownInAssistantMessages ?? true}
<Markdown
{id}
content={model?.info?.meta?.capabilities?.citations == false
? content.replace(/\s*(\[(?:\d+(?:#[^,\]\s]+)?(?:,\s*\d+(?:#[^,\]\s]+)?)*)\])+/g, '')
: content}
{model}
{save}
{preview}
{done}
{editCodeBlock}
{topPadding}
{sourceIds}
{onSourceClick}
{onTaskClick}
{onSave}
onUpdate={async (token) => {
const { lang, text: code } = token;
if (
($settings?.detectArtifacts ?? true) &&
(['html', 'svg'].includes(lang) || (lang === 'xml' && code.includes('svg'))) &&
!$mobile &&
$chatId
) {
await tick();
showArtifacts.set(true);
showControls.set(true);
}
}}
onPreview={async (value) => {
console.log('Preview', value);
await artifactCode.set(value);
await showControls.set(true);
await showArtifacts.set(true);
await showEmbeds.set(false);
}}
/>
if (
($settings?.detectArtifacts ?? true) &&
(['html', 'svg'].includes(lang) || (lang === 'xml' && code.includes('svg'))) &&
!$mobile &&
$chatId
) {
await tick();
showArtifacts.set(true);
showControls.set(true);
}
}}
onPreview={async (value) => {
console.log('Preview', value);
await artifactCode.set(value);
await showControls.set(true);
await showArtifacts.set(true);
await showEmbeds.set(false);
}}
/>
{:else}
{@const extracted = extractDetailsBlocks(content)}
{#if extracted.detailsContent}
<!-- Render structural blocks (tool calls, reasoning, etc.) through Markdown -->
<Markdown {id} content={extracted.detailsContent} {done} />
{/if}
{#if extracted.plainContent}
<div class="whitespace-pre-wrap">{extracted.plainContent}</div>
{/if}
{/if}
</div>
{#if floatingButtons}
@@ -376,12 +376,18 @@
: ' w-full'}"
>
{#if message.content}
<Markdown
id={`${chatId}-${message.id}`}
content={message.content}
{editCodeBlock}
{topPadding}
/>
{#if $settings?.renderMarkdownInUserMessages ?? true}
<Markdown
id={`${chatId}-${message.id}`}
content={message.content}
{editCodeBlock}
{topPadding}
/>
{:else}
<div class="whitespace-pre-wrap" dir={$settings?.chatDirection ?? 'auto'}>
{message.content}
</div>
{/if}
{/if}
</div>
</div>
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@
let temporaryChatByDefault = false;
let chatFadeStreamingText = true;
let collapseCodeBlocks = false;
let renderMarkdownInUserMessages = true;
let renderMarkdownInAssistantMessages = true;
let expandDetails = false;
let renderMarkdownInPreviews = true;
let showChatTitleInTab = true;
@@ -232,6 +234,8 @@
copyFormatted = $settings?.copyFormatted ?? false;
collapseCodeBlocks = $settings?.collapseCodeBlocks ?? false;
renderMarkdownInUserMessages = $settings?.renderMarkdownInUserMessages ?? true;
renderMarkdownInAssistantMessages = $settings?.renderMarkdownInAssistantMessages ?? true;
expandDetails = $settings?.expandDetails ?? false;
renderMarkdownInPreviews = $settings?.renderMarkdownInPreviews ?? true;
@@ -776,6 +780,44 @@
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div class=" py-0.5 flex w-full justify-between">
<div id="render-markdown-user-label" class=" self-center text-xs">
{$i18n.t('Render Markdown in User Messages')}
</div>
<div class="flex items-center gap-2 p-1">
<Switch
ariaLabelledbyId="render-markdown-user-label"
tooltip={true}
bind:state={renderMarkdownInUserMessages}
on:change={() => {
saveSettings({ renderMarkdownInUserMessages });
}}
/>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div class=" py-0.5 flex w-full justify-between">
<div id="render-markdown-assistant-label" class=" self-center text-xs">
{$i18n.t('Render Markdown in Assistant Messages')}
</div>
<div class="flex items-center gap-2 p-1">
<Switch
ariaLabelledbyId="render-markdown-assistant-label"
tooltip={true}
bind:state={renderMarkdownInAssistantMessages}
on:change={() => {
saveSettings({ renderMarkdownInAssistantMessages });
}}
/>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div class=" py-0.5 flex w-full justify-between">
<div id="auto-generation-label" class=" self-center text-xs">
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
<script lang="ts">
import { onDestroy, onMount, tick } from 'svelte';
import { config } from '$lib/stores';
import { injectCsp } from '$lib/utils/csp';
// Props
export let src: string | null = null; // URL or raw HTML (auto-detected)
@@ -192,7 +194,7 @@ window.Chart = parent.Chart; // Chart previously assigned on parent
{#if iframeDoc}
<iframe
bind:this={iframe}
srcdoc={iframeDoc}
srcdoc={injectCsp(iframeDoc, $config?.ui?.iframe_csp ?? '')}
{title}
class={iframeClassName}
style={`${initialHeight ? `height:${initialHeight}px;` : ''}`}
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
<script lang="ts">
import { getContext, onMount } from 'svelte';
import { getContext } from 'svelte';
import Checkbox from '$lib/components/common/Checkbox.svelte';
import Tooltip from '$lib/components/common/Tooltip.svelte';
@@ -7,19 +7,6 @@
export let filters = [];
export let selectedFilterIds = [];
let _filters = {};
onMount(() => {
_filters = filters.reduce((acc, filter) => {
acc[filter.id] = {
...filter,
selected: selectedFilterIds.includes(filter.id)
};
return acc;
}, {});
});
</script>
<div>
@@ -30,21 +17,27 @@
<div class="flex flex-col">
{#if filters.length > 0}
<div class=" flex items-center flex-wrap">
{#each Object.keys(_filters) as filter, filterIdx}
{#each filters as filter}
{@const isSelected = selectedFilterIds.includes(filter.id)}
<div class=" flex items-center gap-2 mr-3">
<div class="self-center flex items-center">
<Checkbox
state={_filters[filter].selected ? 'checked' : 'unchecked'}
state={isSelected ? 'checked' : 'unchecked'}
on:change={(e) => {
_filters[filter].selected = e.detail === 'checked';
selectedFilterIds = Object.keys(_filters).filter((t) => _filters[t].selected);
if (e.detail === 'checked') {
if (!selectedFilterIds.includes(filter.id)) {
selectedFilterIds = [...selectedFilterIds, filter.id];
}
} else {
selectedFilterIds = selectedFilterIds.filter((id) => id !== filter.id);
}
}}
/>
</div>
<div class=" py-0.5 text-sm w-full capitalize font-medium">
<Tooltip content={_filters[filter].meta.description}>
{_filters[filter].name}
<Tooltip content={filter.meta.description}>
{filter.name}
</Tooltip>
</div>
</div>
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
<script lang="ts">
import { getContext, onMount } from 'svelte';
import { getContext } from 'svelte';
import Checkbox from '$lib/components/common/Checkbox.svelte';
import Tooltip from '$lib/components/common/Tooltip.svelte';
@@ -7,19 +7,6 @@
export let filters = [];
export let selectedFilterIds = [];
let _filters = {};
onMount(() => {
_filters = filters.reduce((acc, filter) => {
acc[filter.id] = {
...filter,
selected: selectedFilterIds.includes(filter.id)
};
return acc;
}, {});
});
</script>
{#if filters.length > 0}
@@ -28,31 +15,33 @@
<div class=" self-center text-xs font-medium text-gray-500">{$i18n.t('Filters')}</div>
</div>
<!-- TODO: Filer order matters -->
<!-- TODO: Filter order matters -->
<div class="flex flex-col">
<div class=" flex items-center flex-wrap">
{#each Object.keys(_filters) as filter, filterIdx}
{#each filters as filter}
{@const isSelected = filter.is_global || selectedFilterIds.includes(filter.id)}
<div class=" flex items-center gap-2 mr-3">
<div class="self-center flex items-center">
<Checkbox
state={_filters[filter].is_global
? 'checked'
: _filters[filter].selected
? 'checked'
: 'unchecked'}
disabled={_filters[filter].is_global}
state={isSelected ? 'checked' : 'unchecked'}
disabled={filter.is_global}
on:change={(e) => {
if (!_filters[filter].is_global) {
_filters[filter].selected = e.detail === 'checked';
selectedFilterIds = Object.keys(_filters).filter((t) => _filters[t].selected);
if (filter.is_global) return;
if (e.detail === 'checked') {
if (!selectedFilterIds.includes(filter.id)) {
selectedFilterIds = [...selectedFilterIds, filter.id];
}
} else {
selectedFilterIds = selectedFilterIds.filter((id) => id !== filter.id);
}
}}
/>
</div>
<div class=" py-0.5 text-sm w-full capitalize font-medium">
<Tooltip content={_filters[filter].meta.description}>
{_filters[filter].name}
<Tooltip content={filter.meta.description}>
{filter.name}
</Tooltip>
</div>
</div>
+4 -2
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ export const DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS = {
public_skills: false,
notes: false,
public_notes: false,
public_chats: false
public_chats: false,
public_calendars: false
},
access_grants: {
allow_users: true
@@ -62,7 +63,8 @@ export const DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS = {
image_generation: true,
code_interpreter: true,
memories: true,
automations: false
automations: false,
calendar: true
},
settings: {
interface: true
@@ -288,6 +288,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "",
"Camera": "",
@@ -1700,7 +1701,9 @@
"Remove Model": "حذف الموديل",
"Rename": "إعادة تسمية",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
+3
View File
@@ -288,6 +288,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "مكالمة",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "ميزة الاتصال غير مدعومة عند استخدام محرك Web STT",
"Camera": "الكاميرا",
@@ -1700,7 +1701,9 @@
"Remove Model": "حذف الموديل",
"Rename": "إعادة تسمية",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "إعادة ترتيب النماذج",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Zəng",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Veb STT mühərriki istifadə edildikdə zəng funksiyası dəstəklənmir",
"Camera": "Kamera",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Modeli Sil",
"Rename": "Adını dəyiş",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "Önizləmələrdə Markdown-u emal et",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Modelləri yenidən sırala",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "Cavabla",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Обаждане",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Функцията за обаждане не се поддържа при използването на Web STT двигател",
"Camera": "Камера",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Изтриване на модела",
"Rename": "Преименуване",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Преорганизиране на моделите",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "",
"Camera": "",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "মডেল রিমুভ করুন",
"Rename": "রেনেম",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -283,6 +283,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "སྐད་འབོད།",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Web STT མ་ལག་སྤྱོད་སྐབས་སྐད་འབོད་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་ཆོས་ལ་རྒྱབ་སྐྱོར་མེད།",
"Camera": "པར་ཆས།",
@@ -1695,7 +1696,9 @@
"Remove Model": "དཔེ་དབྱིབས་འདོར་བ།",
"Rename": "མིང་བསྐྱར་འདོགས།",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "དཔེ་དབྱིབས་བསྐྱར་སྒྲིག",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -285,6 +285,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Poziv",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Značajka poziva nije podržana kada se koristi Web STT mehanizam",
"Camera": "Kamera",
@@ -1697,7 +1698,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Ukloni model",
"Rename": "Preimenuj",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -285,6 +285,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "Calendari eliminat",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "Calendaris",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Trucada",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "La funció de trucada no s'admet quan s'utilitza el motor Web STT",
"Camera": "Càmera",
@@ -1697,7 +1698,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Eliminar el model",
"Rename": "Canviar el nom",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "S'ha renombrat a {{name}}",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "Compila el Markdown a les previsualitzacions",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Reordenar els models",
"Repeats": "Repeticions",
"Reply": "Respondre",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "",
"Camera": "",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "",
"Rename": "",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -286,6 +286,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Volání",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Funkce volání není podporována při použití webového STT jádra.",
"Camera": "Kamera",
@@ -1698,7 +1699,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Odebrat model",
"Rename": "Přejmenovat",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Změnit pořadí modelů",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Opkald",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Opkaldsfunktion er ikke understøttet for Web STT engine",
"Camera": "Kamera",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Fjern model",
"Rename": "Omdøb",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Omarranger modeller",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "Svar",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Anruf",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Die Anruffunktion wird bei Verwendung der Web-STT-Engine nicht unterstützt.",
"Camera": "Kamera",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Modell entfernen",
"Rename": "Umbenennen",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "In {{name}} umbenannt",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "Markdown in der Vorschau rendern",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Modelle neu anordnen",
"Repeats": "Wiederholen",
"Reply": "Antworten",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "",
"Camera": "",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "",
"Rename": "",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Κλήση",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Η λειτουργία κλήσης δεν υποστηρίζεται όταν χρησιμοποιείται η μηχανή Web STT",
"Camera": "Κάμερα",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Αφαίρεση Μοντέλου",
"Rename": "Μετονομασία",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Επαναταξινόμηση Μοντέλων",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "Απάντηση",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "",
"Camera": "",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "",
"Rename": "",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "",
"Camera": "",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "",
"Rename": "",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -285,6 +285,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Llamada",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "La funcionalidad de Llamada no está soportada cuando se usa el motor Web STT",
"Camera": "Cámara",
@@ -1697,7 +1698,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Eliminar Modelo",
"Rename": "Renombrar",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "Renombrado como {{name}}",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "Renderizar Markdown en Vista Previa",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Reordenar Modelos",
"Repeats": "Repeticiones",
"Reply": "Responder",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Kõne",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Kõnefunktsioon ei ole Web STT mootorit kasutades toetatud",
"Camera": "Kaamera",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Eemalda mudel",
"Rename": "Nimeta ümber",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "Renderda Markdown eelvaadetes",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Muuda mudelite järjekorda",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "Vasta",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Deia",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Dei funtzioa ez da onartzen Web STT motorra erabiltzean",
"Camera": "Kamera",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Kendu modeloa",
"Rename": "Berrizendatu",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Berrantolatu modeloak",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "تماس",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "ویژگی تماس هنگام استفاده از موتور Web STT پشتیبانی نمی\u200cشود",
"Camera": "دوربین",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "حذف مدل",
"Rename": "تغییر نام",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "ترتیب مجدد مدل\u200cها",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "پاسخ",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "Kalenteri poistettu",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "Kalenterit",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Puhelu",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Puhelutoimintoa ei tueta käytettäessä web-puheentunnistusmoottoria",
"Camera": "Kamera",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Poista malli",
"Rename": "Nimeä uudelleen",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "Nimetty uudelleen {{name}}",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "Renderöi Markdown esikatseluissa",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Uudelleenjärjestä malleja",
"Repeats": "Toistot",
"Reply": "Vastaa",
@@ -285,6 +285,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "Mga Kalendaryo",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Tawag",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "",
"Camera": "",
@@ -1697,7 +1698,9 @@
"Remove Model": "",
"Rename": "Palitan ng Pangalan",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "Sumagot",
@@ -285,6 +285,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Appeler",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "La fonction d'appel n'est pas prise en charge lors de l'utilisation du moteur Web STT",
"Camera": "Appareil photo",
@@ -1697,7 +1698,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Retirer le modèle",
"Rename": "Renommer",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Réorganiser les modèles",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -285,6 +285,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Appeler",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "La fonction d'appel n'est pas prise en charge lors de l'utilisation du moteur Web STT",
"Camera": "Appareil photo",
@@ -1697,7 +1698,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Retirer le modèle",
"Rename": "Renommer",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "Afficher le Markdown dans les aperçus",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Réorganiser les modèles",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "Répondre",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Chamada",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "A funcionalidade da chamada non pode usarse xunto co motor da STT Web",
"Camera": "Cámara",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Eliminar modelo",
"Rename": "Renombrar",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Reordenar modelos",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -285,6 +285,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "",
"Camera": "מצלמה",
@@ -1697,7 +1698,9 @@
"Remove Model": "הסר מודל",
"Rename": "שנה שם",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "",
"Camera": "",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "मोडेल हटाएँ",
"Rename": "नाम बदलें",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -285,6 +285,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Poziv",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Značajka poziva nije podržana kada se koristi Web STT mehanizam",
"Camera": "Kamera",
@@ -1697,7 +1698,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Ukloni model",
"Rename": "Preimenuj",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Hívás",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "A hívás funkció nem támogatott Web STT motor használatakor",
"Camera": "Kamera",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Modell eltávolítása",
"Rename": "Átnevezés",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Modellek átrendezése",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -283,6 +283,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Panggilan",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Fitur panggilan tidak didukung saat menggunakan mesin Web STT",
"Camera": "Kamera",
@@ -1695,7 +1696,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Hapus Model",
"Rename": "Ganti nama",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Glaoigh",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Ní thacaítear le gné glaonna agus inneall Web STT á úsáid",
"Camera": "Ceamara",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Bain an tSamhail",
"Rename": "Athainmnigh",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "Athainmnithe go {{name}}",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "Rindreáil Markdown i Réamhamhairc",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Athordú na Samhlacha",
"Repeats": "Athdhéantar",
"Reply": "Freagra",
@@ -285,6 +285,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Chiamata",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "La funzione di chiamata non è supportata quando si utilizza il motore Web STT",
"Camera": "Fotocamera",
@@ -1697,7 +1698,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Rimuovi Modello",
"Rename": "Rinomina",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Riordina Modelli",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -283,6 +283,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "コール",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Web STTエンジンを使用している場合、コール機能は使用できません",
"Camera": "カメラ",
@@ -1695,7 +1696,9 @@
"Remove Model": "モデルを削除",
"Rename": "名前を変更",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "モデルを並べ替え",
"Repeats": "繰り返し",
"Reply": "",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "ზარი",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "",
"Camera": "კამერა",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "მოდელის წაშლა",
"Rename": "სახელის გადარქმევა",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "მოდელების გადალაგება",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "პასუხი",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Siwel",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Tamahilt n usiwel ur tettwasefrak ara mi ara tesqedceḍ amsedday Web STT",
"Camera": "Takamiṛatt",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Kkes tamudemt",
"Rename": "Snifel isem",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Ales n umizwer n tmudmiwin",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "Tiririt",
@@ -283,6 +283,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "",
"Camera": "",
@@ -1695,7 +1696,9 @@
"Remove Model": "",
"Rename": "",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -286,6 +286,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Skambinti",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Skambučio funkcionalumas neleidžiamas naudojant Web STT variklį",
"Camera": "Kamera",
@@ -1698,7 +1699,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Pašalinti modelį",
"Rename": "Pervadinti",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -285,6 +285,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Zvans",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Zvana funkcija nav atbalstīta, izmantojot Web STT dzinēju",
"Camera": "Kamera",
@@ -1697,7 +1698,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Noņemt modeli",
"Rename": "Pārdēvēt",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Pārkārtot modeļus",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "Atbildēt",
@@ -283,6 +283,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Hubungi",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Ciri panggilan tidak disokong apabila menggunakan enjin Web STT",
"Camera": "Kamera",
@@ -1695,7 +1696,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Hapuskan Model",
"Rename": "Namakan Semula",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "Render Markdown dalam Pratonton",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Susun Semula Model",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "Balas",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Ring",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Ringefunksjonen støttes ikke når du bruker Web STT-motoren",
"Camera": "Kamera",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Fjern modell",
"Rename": "Gi nytt navn",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Sorter modeller på nytt",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "Agenda verwijderd",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "Agenda's",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Oproep",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Belfunctie wordt niet ondersteund bij gebruik van de Web STT engine",
"Camera": "Camera",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Verwijder model",
"Rename": "Hernoemen",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "Hernoemd naar {{name}}",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "Markdown renderen in voorvertoningen",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Herschik modellen",
"Repeats": "Herhalingen",
"Reply": "Antwoorden",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "",
"Camera": "",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "ਮਾਡਲ ਹਟਾਓ",
"Rename": "ਨਾਮ ਬਦਲੋ",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -286,6 +286,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Rozmowa",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Funkcja rozmowy nie jest obsługiwana przy użyciu przeglądarkowego silnika STT",
"Camera": "Kamera",
@@ -1698,7 +1699,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Usuń model",
"Rename": "Zmień nazwę",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Zmień kolejność modeli",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "Odpowiedz",
+37 -34
View File
@@ -281,10 +281,11 @@
"Bypass Web Loader": "Ignorar carregador da Web",
"Cache Base Model List": "Lista de modelos base de cache",
"Calendar": "Calendário",
"Calendar created": "",
"Calendar created": "Calendário criado",
"Calendar deleted": "Calendário excluído",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendar name": "Nome do calendário",
"Calendars": "Calendários",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "Compartilhamento Público de Calendários",
"Call": "Chamada",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "O recurso de chamada não é suportado ao usar o mecanismo Web STT",
"Camera": "Câmera",
@@ -316,7 +317,7 @@
"Chat Bubble UI": "Interface de Bolha de Chat",
"Chat Completions": "Gerar Resposta",
"Chat Conversation": "Conversa do Chat",
"Chat deleted.": "",
"Chat deleted.": "Chat excluído.",
"Chat direction": "Direção do Chat",
"Chat exported successfully": "Chat exportado com sucesso",
"Chat History": "Histórico de chat",
@@ -327,7 +328,7 @@
"Chat unshared successfully.": "Compartilhamento do chat removido com sucesso.",
"chats": "chats",
"Chats": "Chats",
"Chats Public Sharing": "",
"Chats Public Sharing": "Compartilhamento Público de Chats",
"Check Again": "Verificar Novamente",
"Check for updates": "Verificar atualizações",
"Checking for updates...": "Verificando atualizações...",
@@ -434,7 +435,7 @@
"Content": "Conteúdo",
"Content Extraction Engine": "Mecanismo de Extração de Conteúdo",
"Content lengths (character counts only)": "Extensão do conteúdo (apenas em caracteres)",
"Context Tokens": "",
"Context Tokens": "Tokens de Contexto",
"Continue Response": "Continuar Resposta",
"Continue with {{provider}}": "Continuar com {{provider}}",
"Continue with Email": "Continuar com Email",
@@ -494,7 +495,7 @@
"Current Model": "Modelo Atual",
"Current Password": "Senha Atual",
"Custom": "Personalizado",
"Custom color": "",
"Custom color": "Cor personalizada",
"Custom description enabled": "Descrição personalizada habilitada",
"Custom Gender": "Gênero personalizado",
"Custom Parameter Name": "Nome do parâmetro personalizado",
@@ -506,7 +507,7 @@
"Data Controls": "Controle de Dados",
"Database": "Banco de Dados",
"Datalab Marker API": "API do Marcador do Datalab",
"Date Modified": "",
"Date Modified": "Data de Modificação",
"Day": "Dia",
"DD/MM/YYYY": "DD/MM/AAAA",
"DDGS Backend": "Backend DDGS",
@@ -585,7 +586,7 @@
"Disable Image Extraction": "Desativar extração de imagem",
"Disable image extraction from the PDF. If Use LLM is enabled, images will be automatically captioned. Defaults to False.": "Desabilite a extração de imagens do PDF. Se a opção Usar LLM estiver habilitada, as imagens serão legendadas automaticamente. O padrão é Falso.",
"Disabled": "Desativado",
"Disconnect OAuth": "",
"Disconnect OAuth": "Desconectar OAuth",
"Discover a function": "Descubra uma função",
"Discover a model": "Descubra um modelo",
"Discover a prompt": "Descubra um prompt",
@@ -775,8 +776,8 @@
"Enter New Password": "Digite uma nova senha",
"Enter Number of Steps (e.g. 50)": "Digite o Número de Passos (por exemplo, 50)",
"Enter Ollama Cloud API Key": "Insira a chave da API do Ollama Cloud",
"Enter PaddleOCR-vl API Base URL": "",
"Enter PaddleOCR-vl API Token": "",
"Enter PaddleOCR-vl API Base URL": "Insira a URL base da API PaddleOCR-vl",
"Enter PaddleOCR-vl API Token": "Insira o token da API PaddleOCR-vl",
"Enter Perplexity API Key": "Insira a chave da API Perplexity",
"Enter Perplexity Search API URL": "Insira a URL da API de pesquisa Perplexity",
"Enter Playwright Timeout": "Insira o tempo limite do Playwright",
@@ -907,7 +908,7 @@
"Failed to create API Key.": "Falha ao criar a Chave API.",
"Failed to delete calendar": "Falha ao excluir calendário",
"Failed to delete note": "Falha ao excluir a nota",
"Failed to disconnect": "",
"Failed to disconnect": "Falha ao desconectar",
"Failed to download image": "Falha ao baixar a imagem",
"Failed to extract content from the file: {{error}}": "Falha ao extrair conteúdo do arquivo: {{error}}",
"Failed to extract content from the file.": "Falha ao extrair conteúdo do arquivo.",
@@ -1231,10 +1232,10 @@
"List calendars, search, create, update, and delete calendar events": "Listar calendários, pesquisar, criar, atualizar e excluir eventos do calendário",
"Listening...": "Escutando...",
"Live": "Ao vivo",
"llama.cpp": "",
"llama.cpp": "llama.cpp",
"Llama.cpp": "Llama.cpp",
"LLMs can make mistakes. Verify important information.": "LLMs podem cometer erros. Verifique informações importantes.",
"Loaded": "",
"Loaded": "Carregado",
"Loader": "Carregador",
"Loading Kokoro.js...": "Carregando Kokoro.js...",
"Loading...": "Carregando...",
@@ -1265,7 +1266,7 @@
"Markdown": "Markdown",
"Markdown Header Text Splitter": "Separador de texto de cabeçalho Markdown",
"Max Speakers": "Máximo de locutores",
"Max tokens to retrieve (1024-32768, default 8192)": "",
"Max tokens to retrieve (1024-32768, default 8192)": "Máximo de tokens para recuperar (1024-32768, padrão 8192)",
"Max Upload Count": "Quantidade máxima de anexos",
"Max Upload Size": "Tamanho máximo do arquivo",
"Maximum characters to return from fetched URLs. Leave empty for no limit.": "Número máximo de caracteres a retornar de URLs buscadas. Deixe em branco para sem limite.",
@@ -1294,7 +1295,7 @@
"Message counts and response timestamps": "Contagem de mensagens e registros de data e hora de resposta",
"Message counts are based on assistant responses.": "A contagem de mensagens é baseada nas respostas do assistente.",
"Message rating should be enabled to use this feature": "A avaliação de mensagens deve estar habilitada para usar este recurso",
"Message text...": "",
"Message text...": "Texto da mensagem...",
"messages": "mensagens",
"Messages": "Mensagens",
"Messages you send after creating your link won't be shared. Users with the URL will be able to view the shared chat.": "Mensagens enviadas após criar seu link não serão compartilhadas. Usuários com o URL poderão visualizar o chat compartilhado.",
@@ -1361,12 +1362,12 @@
"More Options": "Mais opções",
"Move": "Mover",
"Moved {{name}}": "{{name}} movido",
"Mute": "",
"Muted": "",
"Mute": "Silenciar",
"Muted": "Silenciado",
"My Terminal": "Meu Terminal",
"Name": "Nome",
"Name and ID are required, please fill them out": "Nome e ID são obrigatórios, por favor preencha-os",
"Name is required": "",
"Name is required": "O nome é obrigatório",
"Name your knowledge base": "Nome da sua base de conhecimento",
"Name, prompt, and model are required": "Nome, prompt e modelo são obrigatórios.",
"Native": "Nativo",
@@ -1374,8 +1375,8 @@
"New": "Novo",
"New Automation": "Nova Automação",
"New Button": "Novo Botão",
"New calendar": "",
"New Calendar": "",
"New calendar": "Novo calendário",
"New Calendar": "Novo Calendário",
"New Chat": "Novo Chat",
"New Event": "Novo Evento",
"New File": "Novo Arquivo",
@@ -1433,7 +1434,7 @@
"No Notes": "Sem Notas",
"No notes found": "Notas não encontradas",
"No one": "Ninguém",
"No output items": "",
"No output items": "Nenhum item de saída",
"No pinned messages": "Nenhuma mensagem fixada",
"No prompts found": "Nenhum prompt encontrado",
"No results": "Nenhum resultado encontrado",
@@ -1472,8 +1473,8 @@
"OAuth 2.1": "OAuth 2.1",
"OAuth 2.1 (Static)": "OAuth 2.1 (Estático)",
"OAuth ID": "OAuth ID",
"OAuth Server URL": "",
"OAuth session disconnected": "",
"OAuth Server URL": "URL do Servidor OAuth",
"OAuth session disconnected": "Sessão OAuth desconectada",
"October": "Outubro",
"Off": "Desligado",
"Okay, Let's Go!": "Ok, Vamos Lá!",
@@ -1540,8 +1541,8 @@
"Output format": "Formato de saída",
"Output Format": "Formato de Saída",
"Overview": "Visão Geral",
"PaddleOCR-vl": "",
"PaddleOCR-vl API URL required.": "",
"PaddleOCR-vl": "PaddleOCR-vl",
"PaddleOCR-vl API URL required.": "URL da API PaddleOCR-vl é obrigatória.",
"page": "página",
"Page": "Página",
"Page mode creates one document per page. Single mode combines all pages into one document for better chunking across page boundaries.": "O modo de página cria um documento por página. O modo único combina todas as páginas em um único documento para melhor divisão entre páginas.",
@@ -1631,13 +1632,13 @@
"Prompt created successfully": "Prompt criado com sucesso",
"Prompt Name": "Nome do prompt",
"Prompt Suggestions": "Sugestões de Prompt",
"Prompt Template": "",
"Prompt Template": "Modelo de Prompt",
"Prompt updated successfully": "Prompt atualizado com sucesso",
"Prompts": "Prompts",
"Prompts Access": "Acesso aos Prompts",
"Prompts Public Sharing": "Compartilhamento Público dos Prompts",
"Prompts Sharing": "Compartilhamento de Prompts",
"Provider": "",
"Provider": "Provedor",
"Public": "Público",
"Pull \"{{searchValue}}\" from Ollama.com": "Obter \"{{searchValue}}\" de Ollama.com",
"Pull a model from Ollama.com": "Obter um modelo de Ollama.com",
@@ -1660,7 +1661,7 @@
"Reason": "Razão",
"Reasoning Effort": "Esforço de raciocínio",
"Reasoning Tags": "Tags de raciocínio",
"Reasoning text...": "",
"Reasoning text...": "Texto de raciocínio...",
"Recently Used": "Usado recentemente",
"Reconnected": "Reconectado",
"Record": "Gravar",
@@ -1697,7 +1698,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Remover Modelo",
"Rename": "Renomear",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "Renomeado para {{name}}",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "Renderizar Markdown nas Pré-visualizações",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Reordenar modelos",
"Repeats": "Repetições",
"Reply": "Responder",
@@ -1750,7 +1753,7 @@
"Schedule": "Agendar",
"Scheduled time must be in the future": "O horário agendado deve ser no futuro.",
"Scroll On Branch Change": "Rolar na mudança de ramo",
"Scroll to Top": "",
"Scroll to Top": "Rolar para o topo",
"Search": "Pesquisar",
"Search a model": "Pesquisar um modelo",
"Search all emojis": "Pesquisar todos os emojis",
@@ -1974,8 +1977,8 @@
"Support": "Suporte",
"Support this plugin:": "Apoie este plugin:",
"Supported MIME Types": "Tipos MIME suportados",
"Switch to JSON editor": "",
"Switch to visual editor": "",
"Switch to JSON editor": "Mudar para editor JSON",
"Switch to visual editor": "Mudar para editor visual",
"Sync": "Sincronizar",
"Sync Complete!": "Sincronização concluída!",
"Sync directory": "Sincronizar Diretório",
@@ -2051,7 +2054,7 @@
"This option sets the maximum number of tokens the model can generate in its response. Increasing this limit allows the model to provide longer answers, but it may also increase the likelihood of unhelpful or irrelevant content being generated.": "Esta opção define o número máximo de tokens que o modelo pode gerar em sua resposta. Aumentar esse limite permite que o modelo forneça respostas mais longas, mas também pode aumentar a probabilidade de geração de conteúdo inútil ou irrelevante.",
"This option will delete all existing files in the collection and replace them with newly uploaded files.": "Essa opção deletará todos os arquivos existentes na coleção e todos eles serão substituídos.",
"This response was generated by \"{{model}}\"": "Esta resposta foi gerada por \"{{model}}\"",
"This template contains multiple context placeholders ([context] or {{CONTEXT}}). Context will be injected at each occurrence.": "",
"This template contains multiple context placeholders ([context] or {{CONTEXT}}). Context will be injected at each occurrence.": "Este template contém múltiplos marcadores de contexto ([context] ou {{CONTEXT}}). O contexto será injetado em cada ocorrência.",
"This will delete": "Isso vai excluir",
"This will delete <strong>{{NAME}}</strong> and <strong>all its contents</strong>.": "Esta ação excluirá <strong>{{NAME}}</strong> e <strong>todos seus conteúdos</strong>.",
"This will delete all models including custom models": "Isto vai excluir todos os modelos, incluindo personalizados",
@@ -2142,7 +2145,7 @@
"Unknown User": "Usuário desconhecido",
"Unloads {{FROM_NOW}}": "Descarrega {{FROM_NOW}}",
"Unlock mysteries": "Desvendar mistérios",
"Unmute": "",
"Unmute": "Reativar som",
"Unpin": "Desfixar",
"Unpin from Sidebar": "Desfixar da barra lateral",
"Unravel secrets": "Desvendar segredos",
@@ -2221,7 +2224,7 @@
"Visible": "Visível",
"Visible to all users": "Visível para todos os usuários",
"Vision": "Visão",
"Visual": "",
"Visual": "Visual",
"Voice": "Voz",
"Voice Input": "Entrada de voz",
"Voice mode": "Modo de voz",
@@ -285,6 +285,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Chamar",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "A funcionalide de Chamar não é suportada quando usa um motor Web STT",
"Camera": "Câmara",
@@ -1697,7 +1698,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Remover Modelo",
"Rename": "Renomear",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "Renderizar Markdown em Pré-visualizações",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Reordenar Modelos",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "Responder",
@@ -285,6 +285,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Apel",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Funcția de apel nu este suportată când se utilizează motorul Web STT",
"Camera": "Cameră",
@@ -1697,7 +1698,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Înlătură Modelul",
"Rename": "Redenumește",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -286,6 +286,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Вызов",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Функция вызова не поддерживается при использовании Web STT (распознавание речи) движка",
"Camera": "Камера",
@@ -1698,7 +1699,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Удалить модель",
"Rename": "Переименовать",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "Переименовано в {{name}}",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "Отображать Markdown в предпросмотре",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Изменение порядка моделей",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "Ответить",
@@ -286,6 +286,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Volanie",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Funkcia volania nie je podporovaná pri použití Web STT engine.",
"Camera": "Kamera",
@@ -1698,7 +1699,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Odstrániť model",
"Rename": "Premenovať",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -285,6 +285,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Позив",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "",
"Camera": "Камера",
@@ -1697,7 +1698,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Уклони модел",
"Rename": "Преименуј",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Samtal",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Samtalsfunktionen är inte kompatibel med Web Tal-till-text motor",
"Camera": "Kamera",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Ta bort modell",
"Rename": "Byt namn",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Omordna modeller",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "Svara",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "அழைக்கவும்",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Web STT இன்ஜினைப் பயன்படுத்தும் போது அழைப்பு அம்சம் ஆதரிக்கப்படாது",
"Camera": "கேமரா",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "மாதிரியை அகற்று",
"Rename": "மறுபெயரிடு",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "{{name}} என மறுபெயரிடப்பட்டது",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "முன்னோட்டங்களில் ரெண்டர் மார்க் டவுன்",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "மாதிரிகளை மறுவரிசைப்படுத்தவும்",
"Repeats": "மீண்டும் நிகழ்வுகள்",
"Reply": "பதில்",
@@ -283,6 +283,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "โทร",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "ไม่รองรับฟีเจอร์การโทรเมื่อใช้เอนจิน Web STT",
"Camera": "กล้อง",
@@ -1695,7 +1696,9 @@
"Remove Model": "ลบโมเดล",
"Rename": "เปลี่ยนชื่อ",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "จัดลำดับโมเดลใหม่",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "ตอบกลับ",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "",
"Camera": "",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Modeli Aýyr",
"Rename": "Adyny Üýtget",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "Arama",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "Web STT motoru kullanılırken arama özelliği desteklenmiyor",
"Camera": "Kamera",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "Modeli Kaldır",
"Rename": "Yeniden Adlandır",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "Önizlemelerde Markdown'u İşle",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "Modelleri Yeniden Sırala",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
"Calendar deleted": "",
"Calendar name": "",
"Calendars": "",
"Calendars Public Sharing": "",
"Call": "چاقىرىش",
"Call feature is not supported when using Web STT engine": "تور STT ماتورى ئىشلىتىلگەندە چاقىرىش ئىقتىدارى قوللىنىلمايدۇ",
"Camera": "كامېرا",
@@ -1696,7 +1697,9 @@
"Remove Model": "مودېل چىقىرىۋېتىش",
"Rename": "ئات ئۆزگەرتىش",
"Renamed to {{name}}": "",
"Render Markdown in Assistant Messages": "",
"Render Markdown in Previews": "",
"Render Markdown in User Messages": "",
"Reorder Models": "مودېللارنى قايتا تەرتىپلەش",
"Repeats": "",
"Reply": "",

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